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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to gauge the effectiveness of truth commissions and their links to
creating material reparations programs through two central questions. First, are truth
commissions an effective way to achieve justice after periods of conflict marked by mass or
systemic human rights abuses by the government or guerilla groups? Second, do truth
commissions provide a pathway to material reparations programs for victims of these abuses? It
will outline the conceptual basis behind truth commissions, material reparations, and transitional
justice. It will then engage in case studies and a comparative analysis of truth commissions and
material reparations programs in four countries: Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. From
the case studies and analysis, I will argue that truth commissions are an effective way to achieve
comprehensive justice because they are victim-centered mechanisms that create a legitimate
basis from which governments can build prosecutions and reparations programs. Next, I will
argue that truth commissions provide a more favorable political condition for the creation of
reparations programs and that truth commissions and reparations programs reinforce each other’s
effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
Truth commissions have become an important tool in helping governments investigate,
document, and overcome past human rights abuses, especially after mass or systemic human
rights abuses. The most well-known truth commission has been South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of 1995, where South Africans were widely held to have traded legal
justice for truth – full statements to the commission earned those that gave them amnesty for the
human rights abuses to which they confessed. The Commission documented the human rights
abuses committed by both the apartheid government and resistance groups and published a set of
recommendations and reparations programs. However, South Africa was not a pioneer in the use
of truth commissions. They have been in operation for nearly 50 years since Uganda’s first
commission in 1974, and Bolivia and Argentina’s commissions in 1982 and 1983, respectively.
From these beginnings, there have since been over 40 truth commissions around the
world, growing in popularity with governments in countries emerging from conflict marked by
mass or systemic abuses and among those involved in international conflict resolution. They
have arisen as an alternative or complementary tool to the prosecution of perpetrators, as truth
commissions approach the question of justice from a victim-centered approach. Truth
commissions fit into the broader category of transitional justice, judicial and non-judicial
strategies of addressing past systemic human rights abuses at the hands of a government or nonstate group. Recent scholarship has begun to catalog truth commissions and engage in large-scale
quantitative and qualitative comparative studies to gauge their effectiveness, building from early
descriptive scholarship of individual cases.
While punitive reparations began becoming mainstream international legal tools in the
early 1900s, especially after World War I, domestic and international reparations for victims of
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human rights abuses became more widely supported in the decades after World War II. These
reparations pay compensation or restitution to victims as an acknowledgment of the gross human
rights abuses committed against them. Reparations do not achieve full justice for victims, but
they have a unique ability to directly impact the lives of victims. From their inception, truth
commissions often issue recommendations for reparations programs in their final reports, and
these recommendations have varying degrees of implementation and success. This link between
truth commissions and reparations programs presents interesting questions that have not been
fully answered.
This paper will seek to gauge the effectiveness of truth commissions and their links to
creating material reparations programs. It will ask two central questions. First, are truth
commissions an effective way to achieve justice after periods of conflict marked by mass or
systemic human rights abuses by the government or guerilla groups? Second, do truth
commissions provide a pathway to material reparations programs for victims of these abuses?
The first section of this paper will explore the conceptual basis of truth commissions and
transitional justice. The second section will explore the conceptual basis of at reparations and
connect this to practical reparations programs. The third section will conduct case studies of truth
commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru and the material reparations programs
that followed. The fourth section will engage in a comparative analysis of the case studies.
Finally, the fifth section will draw conclusions from the concepts and case studies to advocate for
truth commissions and their ability to lay the practical foundations for material reparations
programs.
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SECTION I: TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Truth Commissions: Definition and Theory
While truth commissions have varied widely in their mandates, designs, and reports, it is
important to define the parameters of truth commissions to be able to compare specific cases and
differentiate these commissions from other mechanisms of governmental investigation. Priscilla
Hayner defines a truth commission as follows:
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing events; (2)
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their
experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final
report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.1
This paper will use this broad definition of truth commissions because while commissions over
time have varied in their mandates, designs, and outcomes, a broad definition allows one to
identify common features and unique factors that can create successful outcomes.
Seeking justice after human rights abuses traditionally focuses on criminal prosecutions,
which hold perpetrators responsible and seek justice for victims by punishing these perpetrators.
While criminal prosecutions are the most powerful and important step in seeking justice, they
alone cannot address the comprehensive needs of a society after emerging from conflict. From
their inception, prosecutions in post-conflict contexts may have very limited information and
data to begin from – many mass or systemic abuses are conducted clandestinely, either without
any records or with records that are inaccessible to judicial systems because the regime still
holds power. For abuses committed by guerilla groups, records may be more mare. Estimates
about the total scale of conflict and abuses made by civil society and international organizations

1

Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2nd ed.
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.
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may be inaccurate due to the lack of access to these primary sources and records. Moreover,
because they focus on individual cases, prosecutions are usually unable to seek broader, systemic
information about human rights abuses and their victims. Legal rules about the gathering and
permissibility of evidence for criminal trials may limit the events and actions investigated and
the information that is revealed to the public. Placing the burden of proof in a criminal
prosecution as beyond a reasonable doubt means that conviction rates may be especially low,
specifically in cases of crimes of clandestine disappearances and murders of victims, where the
clear documentation and physical evidence to back up prosecutorial claims is often rare. This
failure to convict may leave victims and societies feeling that comprehensive justice has not been
achieved.
Critics of truth commissions assert that prosecutions are still the best option compared to
second-best truth commissions because of the strict accountability and deterrence that
prosecutions can bring.2 However, using these mechanisms is not a binary decision. The victimcentered focus of truth commissions is unique compared to perpetrator-focused prosecutions and
can fill in some of the conceptual and political voids that prosecutions cannot. Often, truth
commissions serve as fact-finding bodies where a baseline of information has not been
established or is not accurate. They can determine the scale and scope of abuse in ways that
individual prosecutions cannot and can provide information for future prosecutions. Politically,
the challenge of dealing with those who committed past human rights abuses and those who
suffered is compounded because the abusers negotiated their departure from power and may still
hold significant power and influence or may have granted themselves amnesty from prosecution.

2

Eric. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and
Democracy (London: Routledge, 2010), 5.
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While the concept of reconciliation from truth commissions may be imprinted on the
international memory, stemming from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is
important to note that truth commissions are not necessarily meant to create reconciliation,
though they can create conditions for reconciliation and healing. As defined, truth commissions
are tasked with investigating and documenting abuses. Recommending reconciliation measures
may be mandated from the inception of a truth commission and its findings may be used to
launch reconciliation programs and policies. By focusing on giving an official platform to the
stories of the victims of human rights abuses and memorializing their words through recordings
or reports, truth commissions can build individual and collective memories of abuses.3
Ultimately, in a post-conflict society, reconciliation is highly dependent on the context of the
country and what reconciliation means for political leaders and the public.
The concept of reconciliation is a deeply subjective topic, often stemming from religious
notions. This paper will not focus on truth commissions and their ability to promote
reconciliation because reconciliation is not the same as justice for victims of mass abuses, which
should be the focus when examining the use of commissions. It would be unreasonable to expect
victims to reconcile with the perpetrators of abuse. The narrative of reconciliation must not be
used as a tool to distract from the important task of achieving justice for victims and society
through mechanisms such as prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations programs. When
analyzing truth commissions, one must understand that they are necessarily political – a battle
over material, historical, and symbolic resources. As Onur Bakiner notes:

3

Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 4
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Commissioners and the staff constantly make choices when they define such basic
objectives as truth, reconciliation, justice, memory, reparation, and recognition,
and decide how these objectives should be met and whose needs should be met.
Inevitably, there will be winners and losers in a truth commission process.4
Due to the political nature of truth commissions, they cannot be analyzed in isolation as legal
mechanisms, but rather as political bodies in the broader political contexts they exist in. They
may also be subversive – while new political leaders may sanction the creation of truth
commissions to legitimate their governance and give the country a mechanism to achieve justice,
the commission’s findings may not only taint the image of the previous regime, but also the
image of those who are currently in power. This possibility can have significant effects on the
implementation and reception of a truth commission’s work.
Table 1 is a compiled list of all truth commissions that have occurred, providing a
reference point to situate discussions of commissions.

4

Onur Bakiner, Truth Commissions: Memory, Power, and Legitimacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2016), 3.
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Table 1: List of All Truth Commissions 5
Country
1. Uganda 1
2. Bolivia
3. Argentina
4. Uruguay
5. Zimbabwe
6. Philippines
7. Uganda 2
8. Chile 1
9. Nepal
10. Chad
11. El Salvador
12. Germany
13. Sri Lanka
14. Haiti
15. South Africa
16. Ecuador 1
17. Guatemala
18. Nigeria
19. Uruguay 2
20. South Korea 1
21. Panama
22. Peru
23. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and
Montenegro
24. Ghana
25. Sierra Leone
26. Timor-Leste
27. Chile 2
28. Democratic Republic of the Congo
29. Morocco
30. Paraguay
31. Indonesia and Timor-Leste
32. South Korea 2
33. Liberia
34. Ecuador 2

Dates of Operation
1974
1982-1984
1983–1984
1985
1985
1986–1987
1986–1995
1990–1991
1990–1991
1991–1992
1992–1993
1992–1998
1994–1997
1995–1996
1995–2002
1996–1997
1997–1999
1999–2002
2000–2003
2000–2004
2001–2002
2001–2003
2001–2003
2002–2004
2002–2004
2002–2005
2003-2005
2004-2006
2004–2006
2004–2008
2005–2008
2005-2010
2006-2009
2008–2010

Operating from Patricia Hayner’s definition of truth commissions stated above, the following chart categorizes all
truth commissions identified by scholars, to date. This chart includes a compilation of all commissions listed by:
Bakiner, Truth Commissions, 27-29; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, xi; and “Truth Commission Digital Collection,”
United States Institute of Peace, 2011, https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/03/truth-commission-digitalcollection. The exact number of truth commissions to date is not of utmost importance for this paper. Rather an idea
of the scale of proliferation, time periods, and regions where truth commissions have been implemented will inform
my analysis.
5
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35. Mauritius
36. Solomon Islands
37. Togo
38. Kenya
39. Canada
40. Honduras
41. Thailand
42. Brazil
43. Côte d'Ivoire

2009-2011
2009-2012
2009-2013
2009-2013
2009-2015
2010-2011
2010-2012
2011-2014
2012-2014
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Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice
Truth commissions fall into the broader category of transitional justice – a variety of
mechanisms used after a political transition to address wrongdoings of the previous regime,
including mass or systemic human rights abuses. The modern transitional justice toolkit includes
punishing perpetrators through prosecutions, establishing truth commissions, implementing
reparations programs, purging bureaucracies or security forces of abusers, promoting
reconciliation measures, and reforming institutions, but can include many other mechanisms and
institutions.6
I will first outline a few conceptual mechanisms that are useful when analyzing
transitional justice institutions and I will place truth commissions and reparations programs into
this broader conceptual framework.
John Elster categorizes transitional justice into three institutional forms – legal justice,
political justice, and administrative justice – with legal and political justice forming two sides of
a continuum.7 Pure political justice occurs when the executive branch of the government
unilaterally identifies wrongdoers and decides their fate without the presence of juridical
standards for evidence or appeal.8 Examples of this include sending officials into exile, summary
executions, or show trials with preordained outcomes. On the other end of this spectrum, pure
legal justice is characterized by four aspects: unambiguous laws, an insulated and independent
judiciary, unbiased judges and jurors interpreting the law, and the presence of due process.9
Striving towards pure legal justice is a key foundation for transitional justice tools. Finally,

6

Hayner, 8-10.
Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 84.
8
Elster, 84.
9
Elster, 86-88.
7
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administrative justice includes purges in public administration and lies somewhere along the
political-legal spectrum based on the ability of those purged to appeal to legal entities.10
Elster also identifies levels of transitional justice: supranational institutions, nation-states,
corporate actors, and individuals.11 Supranational institutions include international tribunals,
such as the International War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the
Nuremberg Trials after World War II, which are generally considered exogenous because they
were created by international bodies. Nation-state level transitional justice institutions refer to
generally endogenous institutions initiated by actors within the country where said justice
measures are implemented. Corporate actors may be targeted either as dispensers of justice or as
targets of justice mechanisms and can include political groups, religious organizations, or private
companies.12 Individual or private justice mechanisms are carried out without the purview or
sanction of the political or legal system, such as extrajudicial killings or social ostracism.
Ruti Teitel proposes a three-phase genealogy of transitional justice that is helpful to
situate different phases of the subject and its manifestations. Teitel traces the origins of modern
transitional justice, Phase I, to the post-World War II phase beginning in 1945 with the
Nuremberg Trials.13 This phase generally fits into Elster’s conception of supranational
transitional justice, which Teitel argues is a unique and triumphant phase of transnational
collaboration in transitional justice given the unique political conditions of the postwar world.14
Teitel associates the beginning of Phase II of transitional justice with the weakening and ultimate
collapse of the Soviet Union and mass democratization trends, beginning in the late 1970s with

10

Elster, 92.
Elster, 95.
12
Elster, 94.
13
Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2013: 69–94), 70.
14
Teitel, 70.
11
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the withdrawal of support for guerilla forces in Latin America, facilitating the end of military
rule in the region.15 These transitions were followed by regime transitions in Eastern Europe,
Africa, and Central America, fueled by the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War.16 These
transitions were mostly endogenous political transitions focused around the nation-state level of
Elster's classification. Phase III of Teitel’s genealogy begins at the end of the twentieth century
and is associated with globalization and transitional justice mechanisms becoming the standard
means to approach transition.17 Notably, this phase returns to the international approaches
identified in Phase I, involving mechanisms that are both supranational and nation-state focused.
These categorizations help refine the focus of this paper. Under Elster's categorization of
political, legal, and administrative justice, truth commissions fall on the spectrum of political and
legal justice, often closer to the legal justice end of the spectrum, though this does vary. Truth
commissions, through their actions or the use of information from their reports, can also act as
tools of administrative justice. Similarly, the use of reparations falls somewhere on the political
and legal justice spectrum, often landing closer to the political justice side, again varying based
on different cases. Neither of these tools of transitional justice encompasses either pure political
justice or pure legal justice, and analyses of specific cases can paint a better picture of where to
situate these institutions along Elster's spectrum. Elster’s levels of transitional justice are also
important. This paper will mostly focus on truth commissions and reparations from a nation-state
level, and the result of these nation-state mechanisms often affect corporate and individual
actions. It will also address the role of supranational institutions as current international
organizations are encouraging the implementation of transitional justice measures.

15

Teitel, 71.
Teitel, 71.
17
Teitel, 71-72.
16

17
Teitel's genealogy of transitional justice, specifically Phase II and Phase III, will
encompass the four country case studies of this paper. Phase II encompasses the proliferation of
truth commissions beginning with the earliest truth commission in Uganda (1974), and the
increased use of commissions in Bolivia (1982-1984), Argentina (1983-1984), Uruguay (1985),
Zimbabwe (1985), Uganda (1986-1995), Chile (1990-1991), and more.18 These commissions
largely focus on nation-state institutions including truth commissions and reparations. Phase III
provides the opportunity to apply nation-state approaches from Phase II, combined with revived
interest from international institutions to refine mechanisms of transitional justice.

18

Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, xi.
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SECTION II: REPARATIONS
A Theory of Reparations
In international law, transitional justice, and philosophy, reparations have numerous
meanings. Pablo de Greiff puts reparations in two categories: juridical reparations and
reparations programs. Juridical reparations programs under international law can include
restitution (reestablishing the victim’s original job, property, citizenship, etc.), compensation (for
economic, physical, mental, moral injuries), rehabilitation (social, media, psychological, legal),
and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrecurrence (a broad category that can include apologies,
exhumations, sanctioning perpetrators, etc.).19 While these juridical reparations can manifest in a
variety of ways, reparations programs refer concretely to large-scale reparative measures to
provide benefits to victims of specific crimes.20 Reparations programs can deliver symbolic or
material reparations through individual or collective means.21 Symbolic individual reparations
can include personal letters of apologies, copies of truth commissions, or the proper burial of
victims, while symbolic collective reparations can include public acts of apology,
commemorative days, or establishing museums, monuments, and public places in honor of
victims.22 Material individual reparations can include individual grants or payments, while
material collective reparations can include medical, educational, and housing service packages.23
This paper will focus its analysis of reparations on this second, more narrow category of
reparations – reparations programs and not juridical reparations. Furthermore, it will specifically
focus on material reparations programs, not symbolic reparations programs. Material reparations

Pablo de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006, 451–77), 453.
20
de Greiff, 453.
21
de Greiff, 453.
22
de Greiff, 468.
23
de Greiff, 468-469.
19
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programs are unique because they directly benefit victims of abuses through both depth and
breadth. While trials focus on punishing the perpetrator, reparations programs focus on directly
and materially addressing the needs of victims, filling the gap in other victim-centered justice
measures, such as truth commissions. This is because reparations programs individually address
every victim, while truth commissions may focus on examining larger-scale systems and
practices, and individual interviews during the truth process often cannot cover every single
victim. Additionally, reparations programs operate at a mass scale, addressing systemic abuses
committed against victims – the reach of which cannot be matched by adding singular trials
together.
Ernesto Verdeja asserts that reparations programs achieve the following goals:
[Reparations] publicly reassert victims' moral worth and dignity; make a society
reconsider its notion of the 'we' when faced with reintegrating as equals those who
were violated, injured, and marginalized in the past; foster the development of
public trust in state institutions (important where the state is a primary violator of
rights); contribute to undermining the justificatory narratives given by
perpetrators by resituating victims as moral agents; and generate a public, critical
interpretation of history, a careful reappraisal that moves away from monumental
and unreflective understandings of the past.24
If the goal of reparations programs is to center victims in the justice process, then
evidence of victim preferences is crucial, and these preferences support reparations programs. In
a survey of Nepali victims who suffered abuses during the 1996 to 2006 civil war between the
Kingdom and the Communist Party of Nepal, 90% wanted the prosecutions of perpetrators who
committed crimes such as torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.25 Notably, 54% of
victims indicated that they felt compensation for crimes, material reparations, was more

Ernesto Verdeja, “Reparations in Democratic Transitions,” Res Publica 12, no. 2 (2006: 115–36), 135.
Simon Robins, “Nepali Voices: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, Reparations and the Transition in
Nepal,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 1, no. 2 (2009: 320–31), 321.
24
25

20
important than trials.26 When asked about their immediate needs, 24% of victims chose
compensation, 17% chose education, 12% chose basic needs, 8% chose employment, 7% chose
finding the disappeared, and 3% chose punishing perpetrators.27 This data lends weight to the
importance of reparations programs for victims of abuses, for whom monetary reparations may
achieve a type of justice and closure that trials cannot. As will be demonstrated by the case
studies, many of those disproportionately impacted by conflict are poor, and often macro-level
institutions such as trials or truth commissions have no material impact on their livelihoods,
which the abuses committed against them deprived them of.
Under Elster’s political-legal spectrum of transitional justice institutions, reparations
programs are not pure legal justice because they necessarily satisfy aspects of political justice.
De Greiff notes that legal systems operate fundamentally from the position that breaking the law
is an exceptional circumstance that has to be punished through trials.28 However, mass
reparations programs address systemic abuses committed against significant portions of the
population, where widespread violations were the norm, not the exception. The systemic nature
of reparations programs also allows them to address political questions beyond individual
compensation, using collective reparations as a tool to address systemic political concerns,
including rebuilding perceptions of the legitimacy of state institutions after the state committed
abuses.

26

Robins, 324.
Robins, 325.
28
de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations”, 454.
27
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Practical Reparations
While reparations should conceptually and from a victim's point of view, be prioritized in
a project of transitional justice, there are significant impediments to the realization of reparations
programs. As reparations programs are carried out on behalf of victims, who as a group do not
generally have significant political power, the political will to implement reparations programs is
often low.29 Financing these programs is hard as well. For new political leaders coming out of a
transition process, it may be more appealing to invest funds into policies and development
projects that are future-looking, rather than reparations programs, which seem more rectificatory
and focused on the past. Though not implementing reparations programs may seem politically
smart to politicians, victims are left feeling that nothing has been done for them, creating future
opportunities for the reignition of conflict.
Growing support from victims, civil society, and international organizations means that
reparations programs are becoming more common in countries around the world. Internationally,
various United Nations treaties have enshrined the right to reparations in international law,
particularly through the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, which was adopted in 2005. International human
rights courts have ruled in favor of reparations for human rights abuses. Many countries around
the world have created reparations programs for various abuses, including illegal internment,
forced sterilizations, and historical oppression.

Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Social and Legal
Studies 21, no. 2 (2012: 171–86), 177.
29
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SECTION III: CASE STUDIES
Methodology
This paper will engage in case studies of truth commissions and material reparations
programs in four countries, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, examining their political
contexts, operational characteristics, final reports, broader impacts, and material reparations
programs. These case studies will form the basis of the conclusions in the following sections in
examining the degree to which truth commissions can provide the basis for substantive material
reparations programs. Most truth commissions have been concentrated in Latin America and
Africa. Given the 43 truth commissions listed in Table 1, 72.09% have occurred in Latin
America and Africa (31 commissions). 37.21% of commissions have occurred in Latin America
(16 commissions) and 34.88% of commissions have occurred in Africa (15 commissions).
Scholarship about truth commissions also follows these broad trends, as substantial amounts of
academic scholarship has built up around specifically analyzing Latin American and African
truth commissions, and many present-day commissions take lessons from Latin American and
African designs.
I will narrow the geographic focus of the case studies to truth commissions and material
reparations programs in Latin America, specifically in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru.
These cases provide variation in the nature of the conflict before transition, the design of truth
commissions, the material reparations programs implemented, and the relative wealth of each
nation. Though two truth commissions have occurred in Chile, each investigating different types
of crimes, they both investigated the same conflict and period, and therefore will be studied
together. The nature of the conflicts in Argentina and Chile can be characterized as class
conflicts, while the nature of the conflicts in Peru and Guatemala can be characterized as ethnic
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conflicts. This variation in the nature of conflict can inform if truth commissions and material
reparations programs operate differently given class or ethnic conflicts and how a country’s
wealth impacts the scale of material reparations programs.
Truth commissions in other parts of the world, particularly Africa, have been extremely
influential in the design and impact of commissions, and a comprehensive study should
incorporate geographic diversity into its analysis. However, for the scope of this paper, focusing
on an area that has many early truth commissions and a concentrated number of commissions,
Latin America, will produce focused conclusions that can be examined on a global scale.
Additionally, the existence of material reparations programs in each of these four countries after
the commissions can inform the links between commissions and material reparations programs.
While the first truth commission was held in Uganda in 1974, it investigated the
wrongdoings of the same government that had created it and was still in power, and its finished
report was never published by the President. The next truth commission in Bolivia in 1983
suffered from a similar lack of political support and resources, and was disbanded before it could
complete or publish its findings. Therefore, Argentina’s truth commission in 1984 was the first
commission that completed and published its report. Consequently, it has been highly influential
in studies of truth commissions. The Argentine and Bolivian truth commissions catalyzed the use
of truth commissions in countries across Latin America, and their use would then spread around
the world.
The four countries covered by the case studies were tasked with investigating abuses
committed before democratization movements swept through Latin America. Placing them
within the frameworks of Elster and Teitel brings out the broader trends of these commissions.
Under Teitel’s genealogy of transitional justice, the case studies are mostly situated within Phase
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II, though they also straddle the transition into Phase III of transitional justice in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, where international collaboration began to influence truth commissions and
reparations programs. This transition into Phase II will be clear especially in the case study of
Guatemala. Under Elster’s levels of transitional justice, these commissions were nation-state
level investigations focused on establishing abuses carried out by both the state and guerilla
groups, identifying legal and political processes that facilitated these abuses, and estimating the
scale and demographics of the people victimized. Given that these cases fit together into the
same frameworks established by Teitel and Elster, in terms of phase and level of transitional
justice, they provide a baseline of similarity to begin analyses.
While the commissions and their reports in the case studies were all conducted and
written in Spanish, the sources used in this paper will be limited to English language sources.
This obstacle means that I will not get as much nuance and detail into the administrative records
and minutes of commissions, court records, and new laws passed, as much of this information
has not been translated into English. English language scholars who engage in individual or
comparative case studies of truth commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru through
Spanish use records to inform a more nuanced picture of the deliberative processes and legal
implementation of truth commissions and their impacts, and the findings from these scholars will
be used to least partly account for the obstacle.
This type of administrative information would be especially important if one were
analyzing the specific design of various mechanisms of truth commissions and the ideological
and intellectual priorities of commissioners. However, the lack of this type of information does
not detract as much from an analysis of the more general effectiveness of truth commissions in
these countries and their ability to deliver material reparations programs. Given the questions
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that this paper asks and the existence of substantial English language scholarship on these truth
commissions and translations of commission final reports, laws, and other Spanish language
scholarship, this obstacle can be overcome.
The sequence of case studies will be Argentina, Chile (both the first and second truth
commissions), Guatemala, and Peru. The case studies will follow a “chronological” order based
on the date of the commissions, except for the second Chilean commission, which will be
analyzed together with the first Chilean commission. As established earlier, the second Chilean
commission investigated the same conflict as the first commission but focused on victims who
were not killed by the regime and can therefore be analyzed through a single case study of Chile.
This “chronological” order of analysis also means that the first two case studies, Argentina and
Chile, will be focused on conflicts that are characterized by class, while the second two case
studies, Guatemala and Peru, are characterized by ethnic conflict.
Each case study will detail the specific material reparations programs in each country, but
Table 2 below provides an overview of the total amounts of money, in United States dollars, paid
by each country and the percent of the population of each country that material reparations
reached.
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Table 2: Case Studies and Material Reparations
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Country

Years
Active

Years
Investigated

Amount of Material
Reparations Paid

Argentina

1983-1984

1976-1983

Over $3 billion paid to over
16,000 victims or families
of victims of those
disappeared/killed

Chile I

1990-1991

1973-1990

Chile II

2003-2004

1973-1990

Guatemala

1997-1999

1960-1996

Peru

2001-2003

1980-2000

Additional $66 million for
minors who were victims30
$16 million per year for
4,886 families of victims–
about $460 million since
1992 inception.
$45 million per year for
20,000 survivors of torture
– about $720 million since
2005 inception
Between $50-$100 million
to about 33,000 individuals.
About $88 million to
86,000 individuals31

% Total Number
of Reparations
Beneficiaries to
Population
.036%

0.13% impacted
by both the first
and second
Chilean truth
commissions
see above

0.20 %
0.26%
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Argentina: National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons
Background of Conflict
Though Argentina's truth commission focused on investigating the period from 1976 to
1983, Argentines had experienced systemic political violence and human rights abuses beginning
in 1930. Under the culture of military interventionism in political and civil society and Catholic
fundamentalism, the use of violence and torture became common tools of punishment and
repression for the state.32 Instability was a hallmark feature of Argentine politics – between 1928
and 1983, Argentina had nine elected governments, only two of which served out their terms.33
Donald Hodges characterized this period of rule as, “waver[ing] between authoritarian or
exclusionary regimes and populist-corporatist ones, all highly unstable.”34 The one exception in
this unstable period was the presidency of Juan Perón from 1946 to 1955, known as the Peronist
decade. Political parties commonly used armed forces to intervene when they lost power. The
Radical party initiated coups against Perón in 1945 and 1955, and Peronists initiated a coup
against the Radical government in 1966.
Perón, who drew populist power from organized labor and the military, won two
democratic elections in 1946 and 1951 but was forced to flee the country in 1955 after a coalition
of military generals and Catholic nationalists, concerned about “moral degradation”, Peron’s
unwavering support for organized labor, authoritarian abuses, and economic stagnation led a
coup against him. 35 Perón’s staunch support for organized labor groups clashed with the
economic interests of the military and religious elites who led the coup, signaling the class-based
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nature of the conflict and instability in Argentina. In 1973, Perón returned to the presidency after
winning a democratic election, with his wife, Isabel Perón, as his Vice President. When Juan
Perón died in 1974, Isabel Perón became president but was deposed in 1976 by a military junta.
The 1976 coup began an era of Argentine history termed the Dirty War, characterized by
the mainstream emergence of forced disappearances that significantly deviated from the violent
tactics used by previous regimes. Emilio Crenzel argues that the prominence of forced
disappearance signaled a desire by the state to silence and exterminate its rivals and critics
clandestinely.36 Using clandestine detention centers, the regime kidnapped, tortured, and
disposed of "subversives" with the goal of leaving no evidence of the acts that occurred. The
regime mainly targeted those who spoke out against the government and those involved in two
left-wing guerilla groups, the urban Montoneros, and the rural Revolutionary People's Army.37
Crenzel argues that these clandestine practices were aimed at avoiding the international
denunciation that other regimes had incurred, specifically Pinochet in Chile.38 Over this period,
relatives of disappeared victims filed over 5,000 reports to the Argentine Permanent Assembly
for Human Rights and thousands of other reports to international bodies and human rights
organizations.39
In 1982, within days of losing the Malvinas/Falklands War, the junta removed the
president from office, and among widespread protests about the regime and its human rights
abuses, signaled the return to democratic elections in 1983.40 In April of 1983, the regime issued
a document called the Final Document of the Military Junta on the War Against Subversion. It
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stated that all of the regime’s actions were legitimate because they were carried out under Isabel
Perón’s 1975 executive order to the military to “annihilate all subversion.”41 Before the election
in September 1983, the regime passed the National Pacification Act through its puppet legislative
advisory committee, where it granted itself amnesty from future prosecution for crimes
committed during their “antisubversive war.”42
After Raúl Alfonsín won the 1983 election, he needed to meet the demands of justice that
formed the basis of his campaign. He pursued a strategy of limited sanctions against the military
while also attempting to incorporate them into the democratic state.43 He proposed the repeal of
the amnesty law and ordered seven guerrilla leaders and the members of the first three military
juntas to be prosecuted.44 Trials of military officials formed a key part of Alfonsín’s strategy, and
a truth commission would be used to establish public support, the scope of crimes, and the fate of
victims.
Human rights groups and activists demanded a bicameral investigation into the regime by
the Argentine Congress. Fearing that legislators would compete with each other to impose
harsher punishments on perpetrators, which could create more tension with the military and
increase the risk of instability, Alfonsín instead decided to create a truth commission, the
National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP).45 CONADEP can be viewed as a
mediating political tool to balance the demands of human rights groups and the military and
right-wing politicians in opposition groups.
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Truth Commission
CONADEP was created through a presidential decree on December 15, 1983, and instead
of drawing influence from the previously failed commissions of Uganda and Bolivia, architects
of the Commission drew influence from civil society commissions set up by the United States
Congress to address specific issues.46 CONADEP was given six months to receive reports of
disappearances and refer these cases to courts, investigate the fate of the disappeared, locate
kidnapped children, report any activity aimed at destroying evidence, and issue a final report.47
CONADEP was comprised of thirteen members. Ten members were chosen by Alfonsín “for
their consistent stance in defense of human rights and their representation of different walks of
life.”48 Both houses of the Argentine Congress were asked to appoint members, but only the
lower branch, the Chamber of Deputies, appointed three members to the Commission. Ernesto
Sábato, a widely known author, was chosen as the chair. While human rights organizations and
activists wanted a bicameral investigation that could legally compel perpetrators and the military
to testify and produce justiciable information, the Alfonsín government’s choice to create a truth
commission instead limited the investigatory power of the body.
Many human rights organizations resisted CONADEP, arguing that nothing but a
bicameral investigatory body could bring justice. However, the Permanent Assembly for Human
Rights gave all of the complaints it had gathered during the conflict to the Commission, and a
prominent member of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights was appointed to lead the
depositions department of the Commission, where she brought staff members from various
human rights organizations into the Commission’s work.49 The Commission did not hold public
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hearings but created local delegations throughout the country to take over 7,000 statements over
the course of nine months from over 1,500 survivors, families of the disappeared, those involved
in disappearances, and involuntary witnesses of abuses.50 Additionally, Argentine embassies and
consulates were opened to accept testimony, and exiles were encouraged to return and testify.51
The Commission then decided to tour clandestine detention facilities with survivors of
disappearances where perpetrators often still worked. These tours were well-covered by the
media and served as a political and investigatory tool for the Commission, which used media
attention and popular sentiment to gain more access to sites. The Commission compiled site
investigations with testimony into dossiers that they then passed on to the courts, outlining
perpetrators, victims, and evidence at specific sites.52
As it neared the end of its investigation, members of CONADEP debated on whether to
send the evidence it had collected to civilian or military courts – the initial mandate had indicated
it should send evidence to military courts. While Commission members aligned with the
government stuck to the official policy of referring evidence to military courts, members
aligned with human rights organizations wanted evidence to be sent to civilian courts to send a
signal that the military would be accountable to Argentine civilians. Ultimately, the Commission
decided to send evidence to civilian courts.53 If military courts requested evidence, the
Commission would only send testimony from victims or the family of victims who consented to
the information-sharing, demonstrating the substantive role of victims in managing the judicial
outcomes of the Commission.
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Report
In 1984, after nine months of work, CONADEP issued its final report to the public,
named Nunca Más (Never Again). It identified 8,960 people who had disappeared and were
never seen again from its interviews and it listed 365 clandestine torture centers, though it noted
that the total number of victims was probably in the tens of thousands.54 The prologue of the
report begins by saying, “During the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme
right and the far left.”55 Greg Grandin argues that Alfonsín’s strategy of a truth commission and
trials was to paint an image of past transgressions to get Argentines to commit to a set of social
and legal values, staying careful throughout this process to not reach conclusions that were too
divisive and dangerous. Similarly, Grandin argues that the jurists and scholars who made up
CONADEP saw their role as, "mediating between dangerously volatile social groups that had
competing yet equally passionate investments in assigning historical meaning to the term 'dirty
war'."56 The careful wording of the prologue of the report was meant to mediate between guerilla
groups and the military and hold both groups accountable for the violence, though further in the
prologue the report identifies victims as:
Trade union leaders fighting for better wages; youngsters in student unions,
journalists who did not support the regime; psychologists and sociologists simply
for belonging to suspicious professions; young pacifists, nuns and priests who had
taken the teachings of Christ to shanty areas; the friends of these people, too, and
the friends of friends.57
The report almost exclusively documents crimes committed by the state against these victims,
and not many crimes committed by leftist groups. While the rest of the report details these
“Nunca Más (Never Again): Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons),” The
Disappeared Project, 1984,
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm, Part II.
55
“Nunca Más (Never Again)”, Prologue.
56
Greg Grandin, “The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and State Formation
in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala,” American Historical Review 110, no. 1 (2005: 46–67), 52.
57
“Nunca Más (Never Again)”, Prologue.
54

33
crimes and the victims, the prologue to the report demonstrates the political nature of conveying
concepts of truth and history and shows how the authors strategized their conclusions.
The report details repression, outlining the use of abduction, torture, and extermination as
political weapons and describes the use of clandestine detention centers and coordination with
other Latin American countries.58 It found that almost 60% of victims were between 21 and 30
years old, 70% of victims were men, and that children, pregnant women, families, clergy,
journalists, and trade unionists were specifically targeted to instill fear in others.59 The doctrine
behind the crimes of the regime was identified as the Doctrine of National Security, which
sustained totalitarian abuses in service of an ideology of defending the nation from subversive
leftists who were trying to overthrow the state.60 The last part of the report outlines the
Commission’s recommendations, including recommending the swift transfer of deposition
materials to courts, passing laws such as declaring forced abduction a crime against humanity,
strengthening the power of the courts to investigate human rights abuses, and mandating human
rights education in all civilian and military educational institutes.61 The final recommendation is
for a reparations program, which says that the state should ensure that:
[T]he appropriate laws be passed to provide the children and/or relatives of the
disappeared with economic assistance, study grants, social security, and
employment and, at the same time, to authorize measures considered necessary to
alleviate the many and varied family and social problems caused by the
disappearances.62
This reparations clause was not expanded further – it did not specify the restrictiveness of
kinship ties, the degree of economic assistance, or the targeted social and economic programs it
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recommended. The Commission saw the importance of its work as providing a basis of
information to operate from and advocated for the impact of its work to be rooted in
prosecutions, new laws, strengthened legal systems, and education. Given the continued political
instability in Argentina, Commission members may have not felt that they were the body to
propose a detailed and systemic reparations program, but rather that their findings and
recommendations could form the basis for future movements for these programs.
Privately, a list of accused perpetrators was sent to the president to use at his discretion
and the Commission sent 1,086 cases to the judiciary.63 Hayner argues that the information
collected by the Commission was critical in the trials of members of the juntas, helping to put
five generals in prison.64 Though instability after the Commission’s work, including threats from
the military, new amnesty laws, and pardons, slowed the pace of other transitional justice
mechanisms, by late 2009, over 1,400 people had been charged or were under investigation for
their role in the Dirty War, and 68 had been convicted.65
The report was also published as a shorter book – 150,000 copies were sold in the first
eight weeks of publication, and it has now sold more than 500,000 copies in numerous
languages, demonstrating the literary and cultural impact that truth commissions may have.66

Reparations Program
After CONADEP issued its final report and before it was dissolved, the president,
through executive decree, created a new body that would continue compiling information
gathered by the Commission and present it to the courts. It established the Office of the
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Undersecretary for Human and Social Rights, which after numerous name and department
changes, is currently known as the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights. 67 Though the
Commission issued a recommendation for a reparations program for victims of forced
disappearances and their families, no program came to fruition in the years following the its
report because of a variety of factors, including a focus on other objectives, including trials and
continuing to look for missing people and abducted children. In 1987, a group of human rights
organizations and jurists came together to form the Initiative Group for the Convention Against
the Forced Disappearance of Persons to Advocate for an International Convention Against the
Crime of Forced Disappearances and also begin the process of pursuing a reparations program
for victims through international law.68
In Argentina, reparations programs prompted resistance from some human rights groups
and family members of victims who saw these payments as a type of blood money that was paid
instead of pursuing justice through prosecutions.69 Reparations payments officially symbolize
that the disappeared person had died. However, the framework of international law and
obligations to pay reparations advocated by the Initiative Group provided a sound basis to fight
for reparations, and all major Argentine human rights organizations supported the creation of a
reparations program, except for the influential Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Association, which
still maintained that reparations payments were blood money from the state.
Major reparations programs began under Alfonsín's successor, Carlos Menem, who
entered office in 1989. Argentina was still reckoning with the Dirty War as Alfonsín began to
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stop most prosecutions of military officials.70 Menem pursued a strategy of moving forward
through forgiving past crimes by pardoning both military officials and guerilla leaders and
beginning to acquiesce to reparations programs.71
Reparations programs began during the Alfonsín administration when former political
prisoners brought and lost cases in Argentine courts which sought compensation for their time in
prison, which were mostly rejected based on statutes of limitation.72 These prisoners then
brought their cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ of the
Organization of American States.73 As these cases began to be tried and won by victims in this
international court, Carlos Menem came to power and decided to accommodate the demands of
these prisoners. As a former political prisoner of the regime, Menem wanted to implement a
policy that could redress people like him and earn the respect of the Organization of American
States by implementing its mediated solution of creating a reparations program.74
In 1991, a reparations program was agreed upon. For each day of detention, a victim
would be paid the highest equivalent salary of an Argentine government employee, $74. This
works out to $26,400 per year and the maximum payment would be $220,000.75 The period
encompassed by this program began with Isabel Perón’s 1975 declaration to eliminate
subversion to the end of junta rule in 1984. The program was then expanded to those who were
forced into exile, with the same payment structure.76 Victims could use evidence or testimony in
the CONADEP report as proof to seek reparations.77
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Then, in 1994, ten years after CONADEP’s final report, the Argentine Congress passed a
law that created an economic reparations program for victims and families of victims of forced
disappearances and killings.78 Hayner argues that not only was this program implemented in
recognition of the injustice of providing reparations for those who were jailed but not to the
family of the disappeared, but was also a response to national and international court cases where
families of the disappeared began to win monetary settlements for moral damages.79 This law
provoked more debate and resistance than the previous reparations programs. People were
concerned that the state was paying off families instead of pursuing justice against perpetrators
and that it would have to label disappeared people as legally dead.80 The state made clear that
reparations did not satisfy other forms of justice, and importantly, created a new legal status,
“absence by forced disappearance” in 1994. This status “forces the State to accept that the person
was illegally kidnapped by its agents and that he or she never appeared again, dead or alive.” 81
While in the past, families would refuse to claim their relative as dead on principle, making
processes of inheritance, benefits, and lawsuits almost impossible, this new legal definition
created a classification that allowed families to pursue other forms of legal justice.
Under this reparations program for the family of victims of forced disappearances,
families were entitled to a single lump sum of $220,000, paid in government bonds.82 If a family
brought a case to the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights that was among the 8,960 cases in
the CONADEP report, they could easily claim the reparations payment.83 If a case was not
included in the 1984 report, a family would need to corroborate its claim through a previous
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report submitted to another human rights body, mention in the press, or other legal proceedings
that tried to establish the whereabouts of the disappeared person.84 In 2004, another reparations
law was passed that provided victimized children who were born in prison and taken to other
families a payment of between $25,000 and $50,000 and has paid out around $66 million.85
Through the administration of Argentina’s reparations program, CONADEP’s successor,
the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights, has been able to contribute a fuller picture of
political violence in Argentina. While CONADEP focused specifically on forced disappearances,
cases and evidence brought to the Secretariat for other forms of political violence to claim
reparations, such as unjust detention and exile, have painted a fuller picture of a regime whose
abuses were characterized by their clandestine nature. Through reparations programs for political
prisoners, those forced into exile, and the families of victims of forced disappearance, the
Argentine state has paid out more than $3 billion in reparations payments to more than 16,000
people.86
In Argentina, the truth commissions and material reparations programs reinforced each
other. CONADEP’s work documenting the nature of conflict, identifying victims and
perpetrators, and providing courts evidence for prosecution helped catalyze other tools of
transitional justice. The numerous reparations programs implemented helped to collect more
evidence to inform the nature of all political violence in Argentina, strengthening historical
understandings of the conflict. The reparations programs used CONADEP’s findings as an
important legal reference point and the campaign to create the new legal classification of
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“absence by forced disappearance” would not be possible without a detailed and large-scale
investigation of clandestine forced disappearances.
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Chile: National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation/National Commission on
Political Imprisonment and Torture
Background of Conflict
While Chilean politics from the 1930s to 1970s has been characterized by a higher degree
of stability than many of its neighbors in Latin America, there have been two key turbulent eras
that have transformed the political system. First, in 1891, a civil war broke out over opposing
agrarian and mining interests and conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. The
Congress, which was supported by the navy, defeated the President, who was supported by the
army. The Congress changed Chile's political system from a presidential system into a
parliamentary system.87 After the victory for the Conservatives in the civil war, foreign
companies were given a considerable scope of autonomy to invest and operate copper and nitrate
mines. This export-driven mining began to create the class stratifications that would define
Chilean politics and conflict in the next decades. Peasants occupied the bottom of the social
structure and operated under an agrarian peonage system, called the patron-peón system, which
began under Spanish colonialism.88 The working classes in mines and cities began to grow in
size, political influence, and militancy as they demonstrated and fought for labor rights,
organizing through the Radical Party, then the Socialist Workers’ Party, founded in 1912, which
would become the Communist Party.89 A large middle class emerged and organized through the
Democratic Party, and new business and industrial elites acquired money and power through the
export-driven mining economy. This tripartite system of political organization that emerged – the
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socialist and communist aligned working-class, liberal middle class, and conservative elites
would form the basis for future conflict.
Second, Arturo Alessandri won the presidency in 1920 during an economic downturn and
an increase in working-class militancy as a representative of middle-class interests, challenging
the traditional power of elites in Chilean politics.90 The weak presidency meant that Alessandri’s
desires to implement social reforms were blocked by the conservative legislature, so in 1924, he
proposed a new constitution to restore the power of the presidency by bringing in military
support.91 Though the military partnership gave Alessandri the political power to begin passing
his reforms, he felt that his independence had been compromised by the military and went into
exile in September of 1924. This began a turbulent 1920s era of politics in Chile – a military
junta took over, Alessandri was recalled in 1925 and passed the 1925 Constitution which gave
the presidency more power, and then resigned later in 1925. Democratically elected Emiliano
Figueroa Larraín won the presidency in 1925 but was overthrown by Carlos Ibañez in the same
year, who ruled as a dictator from 1925 to 1927. This instability continued in 1932 when Arturo
Alessandri won the presidency again and began governing under the 1925 Constitution, ushering
in an era of stable politics from 1923 to 1973.
The 1925 Constitution created a strong executive and two-chamber legislature that was
elected through proportional representation. Importantly for future conflict, the strong executive
gave the president the power to issue executive decrees that would effectively have the force of
law.92 The use of proportional representation maintained the important tripartite political
divisions between Chileans into Left, Center, and Right, meaning that coalition politics were
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essential and that presidents were often elected with a plurality of votes. Through most of the
20th century, the Left, Center, and Right consistently polled around one-third of the popular vote,
and the class-based nature of these divisions became entrenched.
After decades of a stable political system and Left, Center, and Right parties competing
for political power, Salvador Allende’s 1970 election to the presidency would upset this stability.
Allende, a Marxist and member of the Socialist Party of Chile, was the candidate of Popular
Unity (UP), a coalition of leftist parties whose stated goal was the peaceful transition of Chile
into a socialist state.93 Allende campaigned to use constitutional processes to transform Chile
into a socialist state through land expropriation and redistribution and the nationalization of key
sectors of the economy.94 Two parties in the UP, the Communist Party and Socialist Party,
formed its base of support – Communist Party support came from industrial workers and miners
across the country, while Socialist Party support came from rural and urban lower and middleclass Chileans.95 Beginning in 1960, members of the Communist Party who felt that it was too
conservative left and joined guerilla groups committed to armed struggle, the most significant of
which was called the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).96
Allende won 36.2% of the vote, while Jorge Alessandri, a former president and son of
Arturo Alessandri, running as an independent, won 34.9% of votes, and Radomiro Tomic, a
Christian Democrat, won 27.8% of the vote. Alessandri represented a traditional conservative
elite class. Tomic’s Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was defined by a progressive Catholic
theology and commitment to a communitarian system that sought to find a “third way” between
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Marxist and laissez-faire capitalist systems and became the main party for middle-class Chileans
– professionals, students, bureaucrats, and white-collar workers.97
After winning a plurality of votes, Allende needed Congress to confirm his election, and
the PDC controlled the key votes that would decide his fate. The PDC decided to support
Allende’s confirmation if he signed a Statute of Guarantees that would guarantee the rights of all
political parties, the right to private education, and the non-political nature of the military –
concepts which fit into Allende’s pledge to transition the country to socialism legally and
peacefully.98 After signing this statute, Allende ascended into the presidency.
Allende’s partnership with the PDC quickly broke down – they felt that he was violating
the Statue of Guarantees through his use of executive decrees, and increasing violence from
militant leftists created the perception that Allende tolerated violence. Facing the regular use of
veto powers in Congress from conservatives and Christian Democrats, Allende used the
aforementioned executive decrees established under the 1925 Constitution to requisition factories
and push through legislation to begin nationalization. The clash between the executive and
legislative branches characterized the tensions of 1970 and 1971, but by 1972, these tensions
spilled out to the general public. This era moved away from the tripartite political split of the past
and towards polarization between those who supported the UP and those who did not. A key
event that characterized this polarization was the October 1972 strike, which lasted for more than
a month. As Allende moved to nationalize trucking in a small province, the National Trucking
Association, fearful of Allende nationalizing the entire industry, declared a national strike.99
Small shop owners also began closing across the country to support the truckers and were backed
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by the conservative National Party and the PDC.100 While the Allende government requisitioned
strikers’ trucks to transport goods, mobilized their supporters to help in the effort, and
encouraged workers to take over factories that tried to close during the strike, consumer supplies
were severely limited.101 This mobilization against the government began with grassroots small
business owners and white-collar workers and was then supported by political parties, signaling
an important shift in the nature of polarization in Chile. To end the strike, the government agreed
that it would not take over small private trucking businesses. This agreement was enforced by the
military entering Chilean politics – the leaders of the army, navy, and air force entered into
Allende’s cabinet to guarantee the agreement and the neutrality of the upcoming 1973
congressional elections.102
By the 1973 March congressional election, the PDC and conservative national party
allied together into an opposition coalition named the Democratic Confederation (CODE) to try
to defeat UP. The UP won 43.5% of the popular vote and gained six seats in the lower Chamber
of Deputies and two seats in the Senate, while CODE won 56.5% of the popular vote.103 Though
CODE claimed victory with over 50% of the popular vote, UP’s win signaled their growing base
of support and meant that President Allende could not be impeached in Congress.
Without any way to oust Allende from power through constitutional measures, both the
National Party and Christian Democratic Party committed themselves to overthrowing the
president through a military coup. By claiming election fraud, blocking UP programs in
Congress, organizing and supporting protests and strikes from copper miners and bus drivers,
and partnering with foreign powers, chiefly the United States, the opposition sought to
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destabilize Chile and create the conditions for the military to intervene.104 The Chilean Supreme
Court ruled in May of 1973 that Allende had improperly interfered with judicial processes in the
country, and this charge was reiterated through resolutions in Congress.105 Next, senior army
leaders forced out the constitutionalist head of the army, General Carlos Prats, whom they
painted as closely aligned with the UP, given the military joining Allende’s government, and
replaced him with General Augusto Pinochet.106 In July and August of 1973, the UP, led by
President Allende, and the PDC, led by Patricio Aylwin, negotiated the UP's plan to socialize
key sectors of the economy but failed to find agreement as the PDC kept coming back with more
demands.107 As strikes continued and right-wing groups committed acts of terrorism and
sabotage, Allende turned to his last alternative and planned to announce a plebiscite on his
government on September 11, 1973, which he informed General Pinochet about. With tensions
rising, Allende refused to arm his supporters and stayed committed to the constitutional process
while the opposition was waiting for the military to intervene and hand power to them.108
Finally, on September 11, 1973, the day of the planned plebiscite, Allende was alerted to
a naval rebellion and left for the presidential palace. He initially announced over the radio that
the navy had rebelled, without any knowledge that any other branches of the military were also a
part of the coup.109 However, the next radio broadcast by the entire military and police force
made clear that it was a coup – they demanded that Allende surrender the presidency, and
Allende’s cabinet members began to be arrested – many were jailed, tortured, or disappeared.110
During his second, and last radio broadcast, Allende refused to resign from the presidency
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despite the military guaranteeing a safe flight out of the country if he did. The military began
bombing Allende’s presidential palace, and Allende was later discovered dead with a selfinflicted gunshot wound.111
The junta gave the public a mixed message about its goals during its first public
broadcast. As the senior commander, Pinochet began by saying that patriotic duty had led the
junta to save the country from Allende's chaos and that he had no personal ambitions for power –
instead, the members of the junta would switch off occupying the presidency.112 General Leigh,
the Air Force Commander, spoke about the military’s decisions to intervene after three years of
the “Marxist cancer” and its mission to “fight communism… [and] extirpate it, whatever the
cost.”113 When the director general of the national police spoke, he said that the police joined the
junta to “return to the path of true legality” and “returning the country to the path of obeying the
constitution, and the laws of the Republic.”114
A month later, Pinochet confirmed that the military would not rule for a brief
transitionary period, but instead would engage in a long battle to “extirpate evil from Chile at the
root”, echoing the statements of General Leigh.115 While the PDC expected to emerge as the new
governing party of Chile after the coup, the military junta suspended Congress and made clear
that the PDC's leader would not lead the junta.116 It gave itself, the four-person junta, supreme
rule over the nation through the executive and legislative powers, put political parties in
indefinite recess, banned leftist parties, and installed military officers to most governmental
posts. The junta declared a state of siege that had been created under the 1925 Constitution,
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which was renewed until 1978 and gave it the basis to wage its fight against leftists. The courts
were kept open and acquiesced to the junta – military and police claims were accepted as truth
and judges were fearful of ruling against the junta.
Lois Oppenheim argues that the Chilean military had a two-phased project – first, to rid
the country of leftist political groups and institutions which had fomented class-based
antagonism in Chile, and next, rebuild economic, political, and cultural institutions along
capitalist and anti-Marxist lines.117 Declaring a war of extermination and neutralization against
Marxism and Socialism meant that the regime had declared war against more than 40% of the
Chilean population that had supported Allende and leftist groups. At the end of 1973, the junta
created the Directorate for National Intelligence (DINA), its branch of secret police whose
mission was to interrogate and eliminate leftist leaders and UP supporters from Chile. DINA
engaged in kidnapping, torture, disappearances, and exiles with a key focus. In the first two years
of junta rule, DINA targeted MIR, the left-wing paramilitary organization that had previously
engaged in armed conflict against the state and the military, then in 1976, it targeted members of
the Socialist Party, and in 1977, it targeted members of the Communist Party.118 DINA also
worked with landowners and the fascist right-wing paramilitary group, Fatherland and Liberty, to
target peasants who had sought land reform or engaged in land takeovers.119 Dissidents were
often forced into exile – kidnapped and let go on the Argentine side of the Andes Mountains or
forced onto flights out of the country. The scope of state violence was reduced in 1977 after
DINA, facing American pressure after assassinating a former Allende minister in the United
States in 1976, was disbanded by Pinochet. He replaced it with the National Center for

117

Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 117-118.
Oppenheim, 125.
119
Oppenheim, 125.
118

48
Information (CNI), which carried out a similar mission. To protect itself from future retribution,
the junta implemented a law in 1978 that gave the military amnesty for any crimes committed
from 1973 to 1978 during the aforementioned “state of siege” in Chile.120
While the junta had planned to rule Chile as a collective body, Pinochet consolidated his
singular power as the dual leader of the armed forces and the executive.121 By 1974, Pinochet
had named himself the supreme head of the nation, leader of the junta, and President of Chile.122
He used DINA to eliminate opponents and potential challenges to his power from both the
Allende government and his own – he ousted General Leigh from the junta in 1978 after he had
called for a transition to civilian rule in five years.123 Once he had consolidated power, Pinochet
wanted a new constitution that would keep himself and the military in power, prohibit any leftist
groups, and outline a slow transition to civilian rule. In 1980, Pinochet unveiled this new
Constitution to the public, which included both transitionary and permanent articles. The
transitionary articles meant that the Constitution would not become permanent until eight years
after its introduction. These transitionary articles stated that Pinochet would remain president
until 1989, when the junta would propose a candidate, most likely Pinochet, to be approved
through a plebiscite.124 The candidate who won would rule for eight more years, until 1997.
During this transitionary period, there would be no Congress and no political parties – the junta
would continue making laws until a new Congress in 1990. The permanent articles entrenched
members of the military into the government by creating a National Security Council that had
oversight over civilian government, giving the National Security Council the power to install
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leaders of the branches of the military, establishing a Congress that included nonelected
members from the military and national police, and banning speech about class struggle.125
Additionally, the Constitution stated that Pinochet would remain the Commander in Chief of the
army until 1998 and subsequently would be a senator for life.126 After 30 days of introduction
and with repressed opposition from the Christian Democratic Party, the new junta announced
that the Constitution was approved by two-thirds of the public and rejected by 30% under
suspect electoral conditions.127
In 1981, Pinochet took the presidential oath for an eight-year term and faced an economic
crisis from 1981 to 1982, where laissez-faire economic policy created severe unemployment and
bankruptcies, creating an opening for democratic opposition to emerge. In 1983, the national
copper mining union declared a Day of Protest and began to find support among political parties,
which began a period of protest until 1986.128 Grassroots groups, unions, women, and young
people began attempting to protest during this period from 1983 to 1986 but were severely
repressed by Pinochet. Though they were unsuccessful, this signaled growing opposition to the
regime among working and middle-class Chileans. Political parties began to mobilize to beat
Pinochet through the constitutional plebiscite scheduled for 1988. If more than half of voters
voted no in the plebiscite in support of Pinochet, he would be forced to hold a competitive
presidential election.129 When 55% of voters voted no on the plebiscite, a coalition of sixteen
parties named the Coalition for Democracy ran Patricio Aylwin, the President of the Christian
Democratic Party as their candidate, and faced Hernán Büchi, the regime’s candidate, and
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Francisco Errázuriz, and populist right-wing candidate.130 Aylwin won a majority of votes and
became Chile’s first democratically-elected leader since 1973.

Truth Commission 1
When Aylwin ascended into the presidency in 1990, he faced a tense political situation
and the constitutional limitations established by the 1980 Constitution – Pinochet remained the
commander of the armed forces and had made clear that any step too far would result in military
action. In response to Aylwin’s campaign rhetoric of truth and justice, Pinochet responded, “the
day they touch any one of my men, the state of law is ended.”131 Additionally, the 1978 amnesty
law shielded officials from prosecution, and courts were still occupied by judges loyal or afraid
of the military. In 1990, the Supreme Court rejected a motion that requested the inapplicability of
the 1978 Amnesty Law against military leaders, cementing the military’s impunity during
Aylwin’s presidency.132Aylwin decided to proceed cautiously, aware of the politics of an
unstable democratic transition and the possibility of another military coup, and without feasible
options to pursue prosecutions.
Aylwin established a truth commission, the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation a month into his presidency in April of 1990. The Commission is known as the
Rettig Commission because of its chair, Raúl Rettig. The Rettig Commission was established
through presidential decree and was tasked to investigate “disappearances after arrest,
executions, and torture leading to death committed by government agents or people in their
service, as well as kidnapping and attempts on the life of persons carried out by private citizens
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for political reasons” from the coup on September 11, 1973, to Pinochet's last day in office,
March 11, 1990.133 Cases that did not result in death were left out of the mandate and therefore
the scope of the Commission was narrow. The Commission needed:
a. To establish as complete a picture as possible of those grave events, as well as
their antecedents and circumstances
b. To gather evidence that may make it possible to identify the victims by name
and determine their fate or whereabouts
c. To recommend such measures of reparation and reinstatement as it regards as
just; and
d. To recommend the legal and administrative measure which in its judgment
should be adopted in order to prevent actions such as those mentioned in this
article from being committed.134
The Commission’s power was also limited as it could neither subpoena any witnesses nor
divulge the names of any perpetrators because it was not a judicial body, and instead would refer
its findings to the courts, which could take legal action.135 It was composed of eight members,
four of whom had supported Pinochet and four of whom had been in opposition, and was chaired
by Raúl Rettig, a former liberal senator and ambassador under Allende who represented a nonthreatening form of liberalism.136 It was given nine months, and later a three-month extension, to
produce a final report and had a staff of 60 people.137
Seven of the eight members of the Rettig Commission had law degrees and prioritized a
legalistic notion of truth that privileged documentary information as evidence over testimony.138
The Commission relied heavily on the human rights archive of the Vicariate of Solidarity of the
Catholic Church, which helped document reports of human rights abuses during the regime’s
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rule.139 The Commission then sought to corroborate evidence from numerous other human rights
organizations that had gathered information during the conflict, including the Chilean Human
Rights Commission and Foundation for Social Assistance of the Christian Churches.140 It also
reached out to military, business, labor, and professional organizations, as well as political
parties, to submit lists of victims. The national police, military, MIR, Communist Party, and
other pertinent groups all were asked to provide information. Though many of these groups
responded, the national police and military evaded answering by declaring that records had been
destroyed, they did not have information, or that they could not divulge intelligence
information.141
The Commission interviewed victims by publicizing their work and opening government
offices at the provincial and regional level and consulates and embassies abroad to any person
who wanted to testify about an individual case.142 Given that the Rettig Commission was not
judicial, it was not required to divulge the identities of victims or families who testified, which
was important in a country where Pinochet and his loyalists held considerable power.143
Through corroborating documentary information from civil society and government and
taking victim testimony, the Rettig Commission received 3,428 cases of death and
disappearances.144
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Truth Commission 1: Report
The Rettig Commission issued its 1,800 page report in February of 1991, with President
Aylwin releasing it to the public on national television, asking for forgiveness from victims and
asking the military to make amends.145 Aylwin sent the cases to the Supreme Court and urged
that prosecutions should begin, both ignoring the 1978 amnesty law and focusing on abuses that
had happened after 1978.146 Pinochet responded that he had a “fundamental disagreement” with
the report and stressed the necessity of the 1973 coup.147 The report was well circulated through
prints in newspapers but was not widely printed into books.148 While the report did not release
the name of perpetrators, the Communist party newspaper, El Siglo, acquired this list and
published the names of perpetrators.149
Of the 3,428 cases submitted to the Commission, it found that of the cases that fell under
its mandate, 2,115 people had been killed by the state while 164 had been killed by armed
opposition groups, meaning that 92.8% of victims had been killed by the state while 7.2% of
victims had been killed by armed opposition groups, which was not solely restricted to leftist
groups.150 About 4% of killings were attributed to leftist groups.151 Most of the violence carried
out by the state was under DINA from 1973-1977, when it was tasked with the systematic
extermination of leftist leaders and supporters.152
Importantly, the balance of violence meant that the military's central argument – that the
country suffered a state of siege at the hands of leftist groups and needed to fight a brutal
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campaign against them, was demonstrably false. However, the report did not directly blame the
regime for abuses committed, keeping with Aylwin and Rettig’s strategy of trying to create a
neutral document that would not spark conflict. It said that the military was drawn away from its
role as a neutral constitutionalist and into the conflict.153 Those on the left criticized the report
for trying to establish a moral equivalency between the right and the left before and during 1973,
ignoring Allende’s commitment to constitutionalism and negotiation, and for being “more
sympathetic to the fears that motivated opposition to Allende in defense of private property than
those of the ‘extreme left political groups’ that spread an ‘ideology of armed struggle’.”154
The report recommended a symbolic, legal, and material reparations program as a way
for the state to assume responsibility for the abuses committed. It recommended symbolic
reparations in the form of memorials, monuments, a National Human Rights Day, and organizing
campaigns geared toward reconciliation.155 In terms of legal reparations, it proposed the creation
of legal status, “arrested and disappeared to be dead”, similar to the forcibly disappeared status in
Argentina so that families could proceed with the relevant estate and administrative necessities
for a presumed dead person.156 The report also proposed reparations through social programs for
families. Finally, a material reparations program was proposed for families of those who were
killed by the state, and the Commission recommended that lawmakers codify this program into
law and provided guidances for this codification, chiefly that recipients should be paid no less
than the monthly average family income in Chile each month in reparations.157
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Though the report initially enjoyed support from Congress, in the weeks following the
release of the report, militant leftists assassinated a close Pinochet confidant and advisor, Senator
Jaime Guzmán, and discussions about the political impact of the report subsided as the threat of
militant leftists was raised again.158

Truth Commission 1: Reparations Program
When the Rettig Commission finished its work, Congress created a National Corporation
for Reparation and Reconciliation to continue the Commission’s work and “search for the
remains of the disappeared, resolve cases still left open, organize the commission’s files so that
they could be made public, and institute the reparations program.”159 President Aylwin sent
Congress a draft reparations bill to create a material reparations program for the families of
victims of abuse, and Law 19.123, passed on February 8, 1992, established a monthly pension
reparations program for the families of victims included in the Rettig Commission’s report and
those established by the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation.160 The law
created an overarching monthly pension value, of which different family members would be
entitled to certain percentages of this value – in 1996 currency values, this was 226,667 Chilean
pesos or $537.161 There was no limit to the number of family members who could claim
reparations under this program, as each victim was not divided into percentages. Rather, the
overarching pension value provided a point to calculate individual reparations from. Each month,
the surviving spouse would receive 40% of the total value, the mother (and in her absence, the
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father) of the victim would receive 30%, the mother or father of a victim’s out-of-wedlock
children would receive 15%, and each of the children of the victim would receive 15% until they
reached age 25, unless they were mentally ill, in which case they were entitled to the 15% for the
rest of their lives.162 Each recipient was also entitled to a lump-sum bonus payment equal to 12
months of reparations payments.163
The initial number of beneficiaries was 5,794 in 1992 and dropped to around 3,200
beneficiaries in 2001.164 Additionally, the program gave the children of victims full scholarships
for higher education and a stipend to cover food and supplies while in school until the age of
35.165 The highest yearly cost of these programs was close to $16 million per year.166 In 2021, 29
years after the implementation of this reparations program that paid a maximum of $16 million
per year, the total amount paid would be at most $464 million, though the decreasing number of
beneficiaries each year means that this total figure is lower in reality.

Truth Commission 2
While the Rettig Commission’s report documented cases of human rights abuses,
political debates about these abuses and forms of remedy other than a truth commission and
reparations were severely limited while Pinochet remained as commander-in-chief of the army
until 1998. After he transitioned to become a Senator for life in 1998, Pinochet was arrested in
London on an extradition request from Spain – Spanish judges had used the Rettig report as part
of their evidence against Pinochet.167 Chilean and international activists and lawyers had been
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organizing for Pinochet to be arrested under a principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights
abuses and succeeded.168 Pinochet was placed under house arrest in London until he was released
in 2000 on medical grounds, not extradited to Spain, and returned to Chile. This began a legal
battle in Chile with Pinochet intermittently placed under house arrest under various indictments.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of an indictment in 2000, which it then dismissed in 2002 on
medical grounds, and finally, it overturned this dismissal and ruled in favor of an indictment in
2004, paving the way for prosecutions against Pinochet. Pinochet died in 2006 before being
convicted of any crimes, but he had been implicated in more than 300 cases of human rights
abuses and corruption.169
Pinochet’s arrest shifted the political landscape in Chile, where the judiciary was more
inclined to pursue prosecutions and politicians were more open to accepting the abuses of the
past regime and reconciling. By 2010, 779 officials had been charged in Chilean courts with
human rights abuses, over 200 had been tried and convicted, and 59 were serving sentences in
jail – many of these cases used the Rettig Commission’s records.170
From the beginning of the 1990 transition to democracy until the 2000s, victims of
abuses from the state who had survived had been fighting for their inclusion in the truth process
and a reparations program. Amid the growing demand for a new commission from human rights
groups, President Ricardo Lagos established the National Commission on Political Imprisonment
and Torture in September 2003, which became known as the Valech Commission, named after
Bishop Sergio Valech, the chair of the Commission. The Commission was tasked with
determining the victims of political imprisonment who had been detained and tortured by the
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state between 1973 and 1990 and was mandated to propose a reparations program.171 The Valech
Commission operated between 2003 and 2005 and operated under a 50-year secrecy law wherein
any materials shared with the Commission could not be directed to the judiciary for 50 years in
efforts to maximize the number of victims that would testify.172173 However, victims could
directly bring their testimony to the judiciary and seek prosecutions. Cath Collins argues that the
Valech Commission was regressive, under a legalistic view, compared to the Rettig Commission
in two ways – first, it was more secretive and less publicly accessible, and second, it did not
connect to judicial mechanisms.174
The Valech Commission’s testimony and document collection through government
office, consulates, and embassies was more popular than expected – deadlines for submissions
had to be pushed back as the Commission realized that the scale of political imprisonment and
torture was more widespread than had been estimated.175 By the end of the Commission, it had
taken more than 35,000 statements. Importantly, the scale of abuses was so immense that the
Valech Commission reopened again in 2011 to process even more cases.176

Truth Commission 2: Report
The Valech Commission’s report was published in 2004, with an additional report
published in 2005. It identified 28,549 people who had suffered political imprisonment by the
state.177 The 2011 reopening of the Commission added almost 10,000 people to this number,
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bringing the total number who had suffered political imprisonment as identified by the
Commission to almost 40,000 people.
The report said that “torture was a policy of the state, meant to repress and terrorize the
population.” 178 Two-thirds of the reported cases of torture took place in the months following
the 1973 coup, and 94% of people detained in the months following the coup were tortured.179 Of
the initial 28,549 victims, 1,244 were younger than 18 at the time of the abuses, and 176 were
younger than 13.180 The Commission identified fourteen main forms of torture – electric shock
was the most common, but the state also used, “the setting of dogs on naked female prisoners,
the torture of children to make their parents talk, or the ‘collateral damage’ of miscarriages
induced through sustained beating and sexual assault.”181
As mandated, the report outlined a system of symbolic, educational and health, and
material reparations programs.182

Truth Commission 2: Reparations Program
In 2005, the Chilean government implemented a reparations program similar to what it
had done for the families of victims identified by the Rettig Commission. Victims identified by
the Valech Commission were paid a lifelong monthly pension of about $200 in 2005 prices and
were entitled to similar health care and educational expense programs as the families of
victims.183 The maximum yearly cost of this program is about $45 million. In 2021, 16 years
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after the implementation of this reparations program that paid a maximum of $16 million per
year, the total amount paid would be at most $720 million, though the decreasing number of
beneficiaries each year means that this total figure is lower in reality.
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Guatemala: Commission for Historical Clarification
Background of Conflict
In 1944, members of the working and middle classes forced right-wing military dictator
Jorge Ubico, who had ruled since 1931, to resign, ushering in what became known as “ten years
of spring”, the first period of democratic rule in the country. In his place, Ubico appointed a
three-member military junta to govern, which was overthrown in October 1944 by a coup
launched by army officers, among them Jacobo Árbenz, the future president.184 This began the
Guatemalan Revolution and in 1945, democratic elections for president were held. From 1945 to
1950 Juan José Arévalo governed as Guatemala’s first democratically elected president, and his
successor, Jacobo Árbenz was the second democratically elected president from 1951 until he
was deposed through a coup in 1954. Arévalo and Árbenz were committed to capitalism and
pursued social and political reforms in a country where power was disproportionately held by
large landowners and foreign interests, specifically the United States-based United Fruit
Company, which under Ubico, who was backed by the United States, owned 42% of
Guatemala’s land.185 Arévalo and Árbenz guaranteed political liberties and democratic elections,
abolished forced labor which most of Guatemala’s indigenous population was subjected to, and
instituted social welfare programs and workers’ rights laws that facilitated unionization.186
One of the most important policies pursued by Árbenz was agrarian reform, one of his
main campaign platforms. In 1950, about 2% of people controlled 72% of arable land in
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Guatemala, 12% of which was being cultivated.187 Notably, indigenous Guatemalans, who made
up about 54% of the population in the 1950s, more than 90% of whom were Maya, had been
historically exploited and lived in extreme poverty.188 Árbenz sought to reorient the Guatemalan
economy towards capitalism by focusing on peasant proprietors. Árbenz’s Agrarian Reform
Law, passed in 1952, gave the government the power to expropriate non-cultivated land, pay
landowners in government bonds, and redistribute the land through ownership and leasing
structures to peasants.189 The law redistributed land to over 100,000 families, and workers and
peasants organized in support of the program.190 Historians and economists argue over the
benefits of the agrarian reform law – many argue that it considerably benefitted Mayans, while
others hold that discriminatory distribution gave most land to Ladinos, people of mixed Hispanic
and indigenous backgrounds.191
Agrarian reform and peasant organization angered large landowners, military elites, and
the United Fruit Company, who with the help of the United States, orchestrated an
“anticommunist” coup against Árbenz in 1954, and installed Carlos Castillo Armas into
power.192 Armas was assassinated in 1957 and after an irregular election in 1958, Miguel
Ydígoras Fuentes came into power. During this period, many of the reforms from the 1944-1954
democratic era were rolled back, including the agrarian reform programs of Árbenz.
In 1960, after a group of left-wing army officers orchestrated a failed coup against
Fuentes, they established a guerilla insurgency against the state that would begin the Guatemalan
civil war, which would last for 36 more years. The 1960s and early 1970s of the conflict between
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the state and guerillas has been characterized as a “Gentleman’s War”, fought between members
of urban middle classes and Ladino peasants in the Eastern region of the country. During this
period, Maya in the rural areas of Guatemala began to organize for local community
development through partnerships with the Catholic Church and for political reform by taking
power against local Ladino elites, but Maya did not have a significant presence in local
politics.193 In the 1970s, insurgency groups, including the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and
the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), began to expand into the Western indigenous
highlands, and as Mayan peasants continued to suffer from immense economic inequality, they
were forced to move around the country for seasonal work and to cities to find work, catalyzing
the formation of a distinct Mayan and indigenous political identity that would form the basis of
the resistance to the state.194
For the government, the possibility of the political uprising of the Maya would threaten
the basis of Guatemala itself – since its founding, the Maya and other indigenous people had
been systematically excluded from political or economic power, and their left-wing ideologies
and popular participation would alter the course of the country. In the late 1970s, the government
began killing community and peasant leaders, and from 1981 to 1983, engaged in systematic
massacres of indigenous communities to eliminate the base of support for the insurgency through
a scorched-earth policy.195 From 1980 to 1981, the guerilla insurgency reached its peak, with
estimates of 6,000 to 8,000 fighters and 300,000 to 500,000 collaborators across the country, and
in 1982, groups united together to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG),
a coalition of guerilla and leftist groups to fight against the state, including the EGP and
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ORPA.196 The Maya were identified by the state as a distinct ethnic group that needed to be
systematically targeted to fight the insurgency.197 Mayan communities were classified according
to suspected guerilla activity, and violence was committed that corresponded to the level of
guerilla activity – communities that extensively supported the insurgency were fully
destroyed.198 The most violent phase of this period was presided over by Efraín Ríos Montt, who
was in office from March 1982 to August 1983.
After Montt’s rule and the declaration of victory against the insurgency, military
institutions were imposed throughout the countryside, including forced resettlements, the
militarization of government positions, and mandatory paramilitary defense patrols.199 After
Montt was overthrown in 1983, the military guided a return to democracy in 1985 by drafting a
new constitution and instituting elections where only right-wing and centrist parties were
allowed to run candidates. In 1986, Vinicio Cerezo, the most progressive candidate in the race,
won the presidency and governed until 1990 in what critics called a “civilian counterinsurgency
state”, where the military continued committing abuses against insurgents under the guise of
democracy and civilian rule.200 During the 1980s, civil society groups, Mayan political and
human rights organizations, and the Catholic Church began to pressure the government to begin
negotiating for peace with the URNG, and in 1994, the Guatemalan government formally entered
into peace talks with the URNG, brokered by the United Nations, signing four peace accords that
year.201 The last of these four peace accords was the Agreement on the Establishment of the
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence, which would
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establish a truth commission named the Historical Clarification Commission to investigate
crimes from the civil war.202 In December of 1996, the Guatemalan government and URNG
signed its final peace accord, and the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) began its work
in 1997, three years after it was agreed upon.

Truth Commission
A truth commission in Guatemala appealed to civil society and victim advocacy groups
during peace talks, and they lobbied heavily the URNG and government to institute one.
However, the context of negotiations in Guatemala was distinct compared to Argentina and Chile
because they started while a civil war was ongoing, rather than a truth commission beginning
under a newly established democratic government. The 1994 Agreement to establish a
commission was constrained by these political factors and dictated that “the Commission shall
not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations and report nor shall
these have any judicial aim or effect” and did not give the Commission subpoena powers.203
However, this restriction on naming individuals and restricting judicial capacities left the
Commission’s mandate broad – it was tasked with investigating “the human rights violations and
acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, connected with the armed
conflict” and did not specify a concrete period to investigate, but rather the period from the start
of the conflict to the end of peace agreements.204 Civil society felt that this agreement was weak
given the restraints on the Commission, and Hayner notes that these objections, directed toward
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the URNG, almost derailed the peace process in 1994.205 The Commission was given six months
to finish its work, with the ability for a six-month extension. The chair would be appointed by
the United Nations Secretary-General, and the chair would appoint one Guatemalan academic
and another Guatemalan from any sector as the other chairs.206 Finally, the Commission’s
recommendations would aim to “preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of
mutual respect and observance of human rights and to strengthen the democratic process.”207
The CEH began its work in 1997 with three commissioners. The chair, Christian
Tomuschat, was a German law professor and United Nations Guatemala expert who was
appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.208 The other two commissioners, Edgar
Alfredo Balsells Tojo, a lawyer, and Otilia Lux de Cotí, a Mayan scholar, were appointed by
Tomuschat.209 Tomuschat notes that the CEH decided to focus its investigation mainly on
“attacks on life and personal integrity, in particular extrajudicial executions, forced
disappearances, and sexual violations… its center of gravity focused on violations of basic
human rights, where questions of life and death were at issue.”210
During its peak phases, the CEH had more than 200 staff members and 14 field offices
around the country. Only non-Guatemalans directed field offices and departments to show
neutrality, but Guatemalans worked as staff members on the Commission.211 Interviews were
conducted in private to protect the identities of victims, many of whom feared reprisal from the
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state if they gave testimony. Paul Seils argues that the investigative portion of the CEH was
“unparalleled in the history of truth commissions in Latin America” compared to other
commissions because of its proactive interview structure that went to communities and sought
out people rather than waiting for people to come to regional offices.212 CEH staff visited more
than 2,000 communities, conducted over 500 collective testimonies and more than 7,000
individual testimonies, and estimated that over 20,000 people participated in their investigatory
process.213
In addition to individual and collective interviews, the Commission requested files from
the Guatemalan military, the United States government, and various civil society and victim
groups. While the Guatemalan military claimed to have no records of violence during the civil
war, the Commission successfully requested files thousands of files from the United States
government to be declassified, which gave them an outline of the Guatemalan military's
personnel and organization and United States support for various military dictatorships in the
country.214 Civil society and victim advocacy groups that had collected information during the
conflict provided the Commission with thousands of cases and background information. The
Catholic Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory Project and the International Center for
Human Rights Research, which worked through indigenous organizations throughout the
country, collected thousands of testimonies that were given to the Commission – these two
organizations also published their own reports.215
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Report
In February 1999, the CEH released its final report. Its investigation documented a total
of 42,275 victims – 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced
disappearance.216 Unlike more legalistic reports of other countries, the CEH report, given its
constraints, approached the conflict through lenses of history and social sciences to detail a
broader context within which conflict occurred. The CEH identified the underlying antidemocratic conditions of conflict rooted in severe economic inequality, structural injustice, and
racism against Mayans, where elites tried to create an authoritarian racist state that sought to
exclude the majority of the population and consolidate the power and wealth of elites.217 It stated
that “the violence was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the poor and
above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who fought for justice and greater social
equality” – 83% of the victims were Mayan and 17% were Ladino.218 Using estimates from its
database, comprised of its findings and those of other civil society groups, it estimated that more
than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared.219 93% of the violations documented were
committed by the state, while 3% were committed by guerilla groups.220 The report found that
abuses were carried out against civilians:
Faced with widespread political, socioeconomic, and cultural opposition, the State
resorted to military operations directed towards the physical annihilation or
absolute intimidation of this opposition, through a plan of repression carried out
mainly by the Army and national security forces. On this basis the CEH explains
why the vast majority of the victims of the acts committed by the State were not
combatants in guerrilla groups, but civilians.221
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The Commission documented a total of 669 massacres of defenseless civilian communities – 32
massacres were committed by guerilla groups and 626 massacres were committed by the state in
Mayan villages – their people, animals, and agricultural land, were entirely exterminated by the
military.222 The geographic component of abuses was also important – for example, in the Ixil
region, 70 to 90% of villages were razed.223 The Commission documented extreme acts of
cruelty common to state massacres of Mayan communities:
Acts such as the killing of defenceless children, often by beating them against
walls or throwing them alive into pits where the corpses of adults were later
thrown; the amputation of limbs; the impaling of victims; the killing of persons by
covering them in petrol and burning them alive; the extraction, in the presence of
others, of the viscera of victims who were still alive; the confinement of people
who had been mortally tortured, in agony for days; the opening of the wombs of
pregnant women, and other similarly atrocious acts, were not only acts of extreme
cruelty against the victims, but morally degraded the perpetrators and those who
inspired, ordered or tolerated those actions.224
Throughout the report, the CEH traced institutionalized racism against Mayans, their organizing
and increased political power, and how this created the conditions that targeted them for
destruction by the state. From these patterns of civilian massacres and specific targeting of
Mayan people, the Commission determined that the state had committed genocide against the
Mayan people from 1981 to 1983 through its counterinsurgency operations.225
In the recommendation section of the report, the CEH recommended measures to
preserve the memory of victims, ensure human rights compliance, strengthen democratic
processes, and other measures to promote peace, and proposed a reparations program. The report
recommended a National Reparations Program for the victims and relatives of victims of human
rights violations, including a material reparations program for victims, health and social policies,
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territorially based collective reparations programs, a legal designation for absence due to forced
disappearance, a program to find disappeared children, and a program to exhume graves.226 The
report made clear that Mayans should be central in developing the reparations programs most
important to their communities. The material reparations program proposed by the CEH focuses
on restoring previous property taken during the conflict and compensating victims or families of
victims who suffered “the most serious injuries and losses.”227
After the report’s release, the Guatemalan government released a statement claiming that
the report’s recommendations had already been implemented during the peace process, but a year
later, the new president, Alfonso Portillo, committed to implementing the CEH’s
recommendations.228 Otilia Lux de Cotí, a former commissioner of the CEH, joined Portillo’s
cabinet, but few of the recommendations proposed by the CEH were implemented. Prosecutions
were notably absent after the peace process. In 1999, indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú filed
a case in Spain to extradite Efraín Ríos Montt, president during the most violent period of the
conflict that the CEH determined constituted genocide, including the full CEH report as
evidence.229 In 2006, a Spanish court issued an extradition order, which Guatemala did not
comply with. In 2012, Ríos Montt was tried in a Guatemalan court and was convicted of
genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 80 years in prison, though the conviction
was overturned by the Constitutional Court in 2012, and Ríos Montt died in 2018 while his case
was being retried.230 As of 2009, only 3 of the 626 massacres documented by CEH had been
successfully tried in court by 2009.231
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Reparations Program
Though the CEH recommended a reparations program in its report in 1999, a program
was not created until 2003. In the early 2000s, numerous cases were brought before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights seeking reparations from the Guatemalan state for human
rights abuses. One of the most influential of these cases was the 2004 judgment regarding the
1982 Plan de Sánchez massacre, where government forces massacred a Mayan village of over
250 people – the Court ruled that almost $8 million in compensation needed to be paid.232 Given
this context of international rulings about compensation and advocacy from human rights and
victim groups in Guatemala, the president created the National Program for Reparations (PNR)
through executive decree in 2003, and as of now, it has been renewed until 2023.233 From 2003
to 2005, the PNR paid almost no reparations as a reparations policy was being designed.234 In
2005, after negotiating with victim groups, the PNR instituted a reparations policy with five
parts: restitution measures to reestablish or compensate for material losses (land, houses, etc.),
monetary reparations for abuses committed by the state, psychosocial measures, measures to
dignify victims (memorials, helping to exhume bodies), and cultural restitution measures for
indigenous people.235 Victims or their families are required to present testimony and
identification documents and birth certificates, which can be difficult given the state’s historical
inability to register all Guatemalans, the fact that many land ownership records were destroyed
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during the civil war, and that the PNR will not help victims who do not speak Spanish work with
the state to obtain records.236 Guatemala never established a national database for crimes
committed during the civil war, aside from the CEH’s database and those of civil society
organizations, so each case is processed individually.
The PNR’s monetary reparations program makes a one-time payment for specific crimes
committed by the state. Families could claim payment, but the single payment would be split
among the family.
a) For enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and death resulting from
internal armed conflict, the state pays 24,000 quetzals, about $3100.
b) For torture and sexual violence, the state pays 20,000 quetzals, about $2600.
c) For attempted extrajudicial execution, serious human shield injuries, serious
injuries from indiscriminate attack, serious mine injuries, serious crossfire
injuries, serious persecution injuries, and attempted arbitrary execution, the
state pays 12,000 quetzals, about $1550.237
From 2005 to 2015, the PNR has provided 32,802 reparations payments to victims or their
families.238 Though no total figure has been established by the Guatemalan government, the total
number and range of payments suggest that the PNR has paid between about $50 million and
$100 million between 2005-2015. In 2015, the PNR had more than 38,000 pending applications
to process, which includes more claims to monetary reparations and other reparations.239 The
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman has noted that the greatest success of the PNR has been
its payment of monetary reparations.240
The future of the PNR is unclear – due to its history of creation through the executive
branch, its budget and priorities are dependent on the president. For example, during social-
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democratic President Álvaro Colom’s administration from 2008 to 2012, compensation to
victims was at its maximum, letters of apology from the state accompanied payments, housing
reparations programs began, and symbolic apologies for genocide were common.241 However,
from 2012 to 2015, during President Otto Pérez Molina’s pro-military administration, individual
compensations decreased, symbolic reparations disappeared, and the PNR instead spent money
on community development grants and supporting burial costs.242

241
242

Martínez and Gómez, 28.
Martínez and Gómez, 28.

74
Peru: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Background of Conflict
After oscillating between democratic elections and coups for previous decades, Fernando
Belaúnde of the centrist Popular Unity party was democratically elected President in 1963 on a
revolutionary promise that would impose state intervention to the capitalist economy to correct
injustices. His presidency was marked by political stalemate – Belaúnde clashed with his own
party, which did not hold a majority in Congress, and Congress censured many of Belaúnde’s
cabinets.243 In his first few years in office, Belaúnde tried to pursue agrarian, education, housing,
and other reform programs, but was largely unsuccessful due to resistance from the APRA-UNO
coalition in Congress, composed of the left-wing American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
(APRA) and the right-wing Odriist National Union (UNO).244 In 1968, amidst growing
frustration against Belaúnde’s presidency and rumors that the military would stage a coup,
APRA aligned itself with Belaúnde, whom they preferred over a military coup.245
Throughout Belaúnde’s presidency, the dispute between the International Petroleum
Company (IPC) and the Peruvian state about ownership rights of oil and mineral rights was
constant. Concessions to the American oil company were painted as forms of economic
imperialism. In September of 1968, Belaúnde’s government came to an agreement with IPC,
which claimed ownership rights for the Peruvian state but gave substantial and complex
concessions to the oil company, including millions of dollars in tax forgiveness and ownership of
lucrative refining processes.246 When the final contract was made public, one of its pages was
missing and could not be found. These two factors gave credibility to accusations of corruption

243

David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 292-296.
Werlich, 281-285.
245
Werlich, 288.
246
Werlich, 295-296.
244

75
and fraud, and Popular Unity attempted to dissociate itself from Belaúnde, who then began a
fight to keep control of his party, while APRA stood behind Belaúnde.247 This event gave the
military cover to seize power from a president they believed was ineffective in delivering reform
for Peru. The military, led by Juan Velasco Alvarado, mounted a coup against Belaúnde on
October 3, 1968, and ousted him from office.
From 1978 to 1975, Alvarado ruled as the leader of a radical left-wing military junta that
characterized itself as neither capitalist nor communist and delivered sweeping reforms to poor
peasants and working-class people. Alvarado engaged in agrarian reform, committed to
eliminating all large private estates by 1975 by expropriating land from large landowners and
redistributing it to peasants. 248 His government nationalized or took large stakes in the financial,
telecommunications, transportation, oil, and mining industries, and instituted systems of worker
control in firms.249 Though the junta did not engage in the scope of repression as other rightwing juntas across Latin America and stated its goal as developing a plural and democratic
society, it was still a military dictatorship that was not accountable to its people.
In 1975, as the economy stagnated and Alvarado was suffering health problems,
Francisco Morales-Bermúdez, a moderate within Alvarado’s government, launched a coup
against Alvarado and seized control of the government. Alvarado began to eliminate more leftwing members of the government, instituted more right-wing economic policies, and committed
to bringing Peru back to democratic governance in a few years.250 In 1980, Peru returned to
democratic elections and Fernando Belaúnde was re-elected as President in July.
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However, before the election, the Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path (Shining
Path), a revolutionary Maoist party committed to armed struggle for communism, refused to
participate in the democratic electoral process and staged acts of violence to destabilize the
leftists that decided to participate in the electoral process. On the night before election day in
May of 1980, in the village of Chuschi, in the region of Ayacucho in south-central Peru, a group
of Shining Path members took ballot boxes and ballots for the elections and burned them in the
public square – signifying the start of what they called the “people’s war”, the armed conflict
between the Peruvian state and Shining Path.251
This obscure act did not have much influence on the election. Shining Path was founded
in 1970 by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor, and began with about 51 members,
confined largely to intellectuals and students in the university.252 In 1980, at the beginning of the
conflict, Shining Path had about 520 members, concentrated around Ayacucho.253 Shining Path
claimed to fight for rural peasants in Peru, and expanded its base of support and violence from
1980 to 1982 in Ayacucho, a rural area with mostly peasants, though many peasants did not
support the organization. In 1983 and 1984, the democratically elected president tasked the
military with a counterinsurgency offensive against Shining Path in Ayacucho, which marked
one of the most violent eras of the conflict.254 As both sides engaged in mass abuses against
civilians, Shining Path kept control of Ayacucho, appearing as a lesser of two evils to many
across the country, and began expanding to control Lima, the capital city. By 1989, Shining Path
had about 10,000 members.255
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This war between the state and Shining Path brought a crisis to Peru as it neared the 1990
presidential election – 32% of the territory and 49% of the population was under military control
and it was suffering from an economic crisis.256 Alberto Fujimori, a neoliberal candidate of the
right-wing Cambio 90 political party, won the election. During this era, Shining Path decided to
increase the intensity of their violence in hopes that the government would engage in further
violence against peasants, which could build more support for Shining Path. However, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the military redirected its methods towards more "selective repression" of
Shining Path members and worked with peasant communities to create Self-Defense Committees
that fought back against Shining Path.257 In 1992, violence from Shining Path reached peak
levels – numerous peasant Self-Defense Committees were massacred by Shining Path,
community and political leaders were assassinated, terror attacks and bombings were carried out
in Lima, and more than 100,000 people were displaced.258
In April of 1992, Fujimori claimed obstruction from Congress and initiated a self-coup
where he suspended the Constitution and Congress, dismantled the judiciary, and gave himself
the power to rule through decree during an emergency.259 As the government prepared for an allencompassing war to erupt, the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, was caught in
September of 1992. Violence began to decrease as more members of Shining Path were caught
and prosecuted, and in 1993, Guzmán began to write letters from prison urging Shining Path to
engage in peace talks and argued that Fujimori’s 1992 self-coup was justified.260 This marked the
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end of Shining Path’s influence and violence campaign as they fought for survival – though no
peace deal was ever reached and Shining Path still exists today.
In 1995, Fujimori was reelected to his second term in the presidency and continued ruling
as an authoritarian – he became more repressive towards dissent, exercised enormous control of
the military, and engaged in a forced sterilization program of almost 300,000 people.261 In 1999,
Fujimori announced that he would run for a third term, which was illegal under the Constitution.
However, in 1996, Fujimori was able to make Congress rule that his second term in 1995 was his
first under a new Peruvian constitution.262 In 2000, Fujimori was elected to a third term, despite
numerous allegations of fraud and corruption by using control of the media, electoral boards,
intimidation, and more.263 As Peruvians began large-scale protests, tapes of Fujimori bribing
numerous politicians leaked, and in November 2000, he fled to Japan and resigned from the
presidency.264
In July 2001, with civil society pressure, interim president Valentín Paniagua issued an
executive decree establishing a truth commission.265

Truth Commission
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) was mandated to investigate
murders and massacres, forced disappearances, arbitrary executions, torture, inhumane or
degrading treatment, sexual violence against women, violations of due process, kidnapping and
hostage-taking, violence against children, and violation of collective rights from 1980 to 2000
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committed by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Shining Path, agents of the
state, official civilian defense groups (the Self-Defense Committees), and unofficial civilian selfdefense groups.266 The CVR was made of 12 members, all of whom were Peruvian. The
government collaborated closely with human rights groups to appoint members – the chair,
Salomón Lerner Febres was the President of the Catholic University of Peru, and additional
members included social scientists, human rights activists, clergy, a retired general, a former
Member of Congress in Fujimori’s party.267 There were only two lawyers, unlike many other
commissions made of a majority of lawyers, only one member spoke Quechua, the most widely
spoken indigenous language in Peru, and there were no indigenous people appointed to the
Commission.268 It was given 2 years to complete its work.
The CVR was directed to address abuses of “collective rights of the native and Andean
communities”, refer its cases to the justice system for prosecutions, draft a reparations proposal,
and recommend future reforms.269 It did not have subpoena power but was the first Latin
American truth commission to hold public hearings, and held 14 public hearings.270 At its peak,
the CVR had over 500 staff members and 13 regional offices across the country and collected
about 17,000 statements, 1,100 of which were taken in prisons.271 It collaborated with human
rights groups by processing testimony the groups had collected in their archives.
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The commissioners found that victims wanted foremost for prosecutions of those who
committed abuses.272 Therefore, the CVR decided to use juridical standards of fact-finding in
investigations and referred all information to the attorney general.

Report
In August 2003, the CVR released its 8-volume, 8,000-page final report. It identified
18,397 dead or disappeared people and used statistical estimation to estimate that 69,280 people
had been killed or disappeared during the course of the conflict.273 New testimonies and
information may place the death toll at more than 100,000 people.274 Indigenous Peruvians, who
make up only 25% of the population, comprised 75% of the total victims.275 75% of the victims
were rural, illiterate, poor farmers.276 40% of victims were from Ayacucho, and 12% of victims
were state authorities, such as mayors, judges, or other officials.277 The CVR report addressed
gendered and sexual violence as well, finding over 531 cases of sexual violence committed
against women and men.278 The CVR argued that the indifference that other Peruvians felt
towards the violence and atrocities as they were committed stemmed from discrimination against
Peru’s indigenous people, who have historically been marginalized.279 Shining Path was
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responsible for 54% of the murders and disappearances, while the state was responsible for
37%.280 The Commission found 4,600 clandestine burial sites across Peru.281
The CVR sent 47 specific cases to the attorney general to be prosecuted.282 Though the
report was signed with unanimity, the retired air force general commissioner added a reservation,
claiming that the military had carried out their duty and that some facts in the report were not
fully proven.283
The recommendations section of the report contains 85 items – mainly programs for
political reforms and reparations. At the political level, the report argues that Peru needed a “new
social contract” that would recognize all Peruvians as first-class citizens. Through consultation
with victim groups during the drafting process of the report, the CVR and civil society groups
developed a Comprehensive Reparations Program (PIR) composed of six forms of reparations:
symbolic reparations, health programs, education programs, restitution of rights, economic
reparations, and collective reparations.284 Lisa Magarrell, an adviser for the CVR, notes that the
Commission decided to use the PIR as a program to acknowledge and address the crimes
committed against individuals by the state, while other recommendations would address the
structural issues of inequality and racism identified by the report.285 In terms of economic
reparations, the CVR recommended a lump sum of $10,000 to be distributed to family members
of victims – 2/5 to widows or partners, 2/5 to all of the children, and 1/5 to the parents of the
victim, and a pension of about $5,000 to be given to surviving victims.286
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In 2004, a human rights court was established, as was recommended by the report, and
has obtained about 46 convictions of 88 cases tried.287 Most of these cases have focused on
abuses carried out during Fujimori’s presidency, and not the presidencies of his predecessors. In
2009, Fujimori was convicted of human rights violations and corruption, and was sentenced to
25 years in prison.

Reparations Program
In early 2004, preliminary steps were taken to implement the PIR, when President
Alejandro Toledo set up the High Level Multisectoral Commission (CMAN) to follow up on the
CVR’s report. CMAN was only given a supervisory role, so its impact was limited.288 In early
2005, a law was passed that created the legal categorization of “absence by reason of
disappearance” to address forced disappearances during the conflict.289 In late 2005, a full
version of the PIR was passed by the Peruvian Congress, which was detailed further through a
2006 presidential decree.290 The law and decree assigned CMAN to coordinate the
implementation of the PIR, which included both individual and collective reparations programs,
while the Reparations Council was established to create a single registry of all victims of the
conflict.291 While the CVR’s report recommended that members of “subversive” groups should
be eligible to receive reparations by the state for crimes committed against them, the law passed
by Congress excluded all members of “subversive” organizations who were victimized by the
state from receiving any reparations.292
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The PIR program was based on the CVR recommendation but included a seventh
reparations program: restitution of civil rights, education, health care, collective reparations,
symbolic reparations, access to housing, and economic reparations. Those eligible for economic
reparations were defined through the 2006 Presidential decree as victims who had suffered rape
or injury that resulted in disability, or families of victims that were murdered or disappeared.293
Economic reparations payments began in 2011, and CMAN determined that victims should
receive 10,000 soles, about $2700, while families of victims would split the 10,000 soles.294
As of April 2018, the Reparations Council had registered 226,727 people, not all of
whom were eligible for economic reparations under the program. 141,540 of the registrants were
victims and 85,187 of the registrants were family members of victims.295 By the end of 2019, the
Peruvian government had paid out 324,601,932 soles, about $88 million, in economic reparations
to 85,975 individuals, who comprised 96.3% of those eligible for reparations.296
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SECTION IV: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
Truth Commissions in Comparison
The truth commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru were created after
conflicts that had diverse origins, but they all produced reports that influenced the creation of
material reparations programs for victims who suffered human rights abuses from the state and
guerilla groups. For country comparisons, I will broadly examine the two Peruvian commissions
together, as the Valech Commission can be seen as an extension of the Rettig Commission. I will
compare these truth commissions and the reparations programs that followed through the
analysis of prosecutions, the context of the emergence of these commissions, the involvement of
international bodies, the importance of victim, civil society, and religious groups, initial
mandates during the creation of these truth commissions, commission approaches and
demographics, final reports, and material reparations programs.

Emergence of Truth Commissions – Political Contexts, Prosecutions, Civil Society
In all four countries, prosecutions of the perpetrators of crimes were a central desire for
victim and civil society groups. However, all four of these countries’ governments and people
lacked information about the conflict in their country, and its perpetrators and victims.
Political contexts also constrained the ability to engage in systematic or key prosecutions when
they were creating their commissions. Due to these factors, judicial systems in each country
could not function fully and properly as the sole tool to address the decades of conflict and
violence that had preceded the moment of transition or peace. The bulk of prosecutions occurred
after these truth commissions issued their reports. These prosecutions that followed commissions
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used the findings of the reports and the testimony gathered during the commission process, either
juridically or as background information.
In Argentina and Chile, commissions emerged after a transition to democracy from rightwing military dictatorships in the context of highly unstable societies, where fears of future
military coups and violence committed by state institutions were very credible. While in
Argentina prosecutions formed a key part of the strategy, amnesty laws passed by the regime
significantly slowed the pace of prosecutions, and the clandestine nature of the Dirty War meant
that an investigatory body was necessary to detail the individual and systemic patterns of abuses
committed during the conflict. The truth commission emerged as a compromise measure
between a Congressional investigation demanded by civil society groups and the fear from the
president that opposition interests in Congress could inflame future conflict. In Chile, the
transition to democracy in the executive branch did not mean that Pinochet was out of power: he
remained Commander in Chief of the army and his supporters were in the legislative branch,
shielded from prosecution by amnesty laws. When judicial bodies upheld amnesty laws,
prosecutions were almost impossible. The Chilean case stands out in comparison to the others:
the previous regime that had committed the majority of abuses held the most power, so the threat
of a backlash against prosecutions was palpable.
In Peru, the commission emerged after a return to democracy after Fujimori fled. It was
therefore a case of democratic transition, like Argentina and Chile. However, the origins of the
Peruvian commission differed from these two countries because the conflict still technically
existed when the commissions began –guerilla groups never officially surrendered but were
weakened to a point of inconsequentiality. The threat of future violence was not a constraint on
creating transitional justice mechanisms. The truth commission emerged amid widespread
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protests and outrage against the increasingly dictatorial Fujimori regime and was created by an
unelected interim president responding to popular sentiment rather than by a democratically
elected leader fulfilling their mandate to voters. The scale of the conflict and the balance of
crimes perpetrated by the state and guerilla groups was not known, so a truth commission could
provide this information and create a basis for prosecutions.
In Guatemala, the United Nations-backed peace negotiations to end the civil war did not
focus on prosecutions, but rather on ending conflict, and the state has failed in many other ways
to implement the reforms outlined in the final peace agreement. The commission was created by
the same people who had committed abuses – the government and guerilla groups, which
explains the opposition of many civil society leaders who felt the commission would not be
effective. While the commission could not identify individual perpetrators and was given a vague
but broad task of investigating the causes and effects of the conflict, the commissioners used this
mandate to look at the historical and systemic nature of the conflict where the confluence of
ethnic and class oppression against Mayans led to genocide. United Nations involvement in the
peace process and the truth commission makes the Guatemalan case stand out from the other
three countries as the other commissions were created internally, without international
involvement. Other commissions tried to balance the partisanship of commissioners from their
countries to create credibility, but the Guatemalan truth commission appointed non-Guatemalans
in key positions. Given the emergence of the Guatemalan truth commission as an agreement
between two sides of the conflict, mediated by the United Nations, and a commission chair and
department heads who were not citizens, its findings could in theory hold more credibility and
legitimacy.
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Victim groups (including victims and the family of victims), civil society, and religious
groups in all four countries were crucial driving forces for creating truth commissions,
contributing to their investigation processes, following through on report recommendations, and
keeping the government accountable. Notably, for these four countries in Latin America,
Catholic affiliation rates support the claim about the cultural and political role that institutions of
the Catholic Church and other religious groups played during conflict, in the truth commission
process, and in advocating for further measures. In 2014, 71% of Argentines, 64% of Chileans,
50% of Guatemalans, and 76% of Peruvians identified as Catholic.297 This correlation gave
religious institutions a powerful cultural and political role in the transitional justice process in
each country – its approval and participation could legitimate the findings of the commission. In
Chile and Guatemala, testimonies and databases gathered during the conflict by various religious
and human rights groups became the starting point for building a database of victims, while in
Peru, civil society and religious groups were consulted extensively in developing a reparations
program and other recommendations. More generally, the role of religious organizations in
transitional justice may differ significantly depending on religious organizations and the
religiosity of a country’s people.

Truth Commission Design and Reports
The initial mandates impacted the trajectory of each truth commission’s work and final
report. A legalistic mandate in Argentina led to the investigation of cases for prosecution and
fact-finding. Without a clear mandate for reparations and reform programs, the final report only
briefly mentioned the need for reparations. In Chile and Peru, investigative mandates also
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existed, but political support for reparations at the inception of the truth commissions and
express mandates to propose reparations programs meant that the commissions proposed detailed
reparations programs that formed the framework of the programs implemented in each country.
In Guatemala, a broad mandate to investigate the conflict and propose recommendations gave the
commission broad agency in outlining the historical and political sources of the conflict,
identifying systemic abuses carried out, and proposing reparations and reforms to transform
society.
The demographics of the commissioners in each country also impacted the way that the
commissions functioned. In Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, most of the commissioners were
lawyers – and many operated investigations and interviews through juridical processes.
Guatemala’s truth commission is unique in this group given the role of internationally appointed
commissioners and non-Guatemalan heads of commission departments. The Guatemalan truth
commission took an approach that was informed by the large numbers of social scientists it
employed – and used disciplines such as sociology, history, political science, and psychology to
identify systemic trends, while also focusing on individual cases. In Peru, most commissioners of
the truth commission were not lawyers, but operated under a detailed mandate. The Peruvian
truth commission’s report satisfied the mandate but also drew from other disciplines to identify
the ethnic and class-based discrimination against indigenous people.
None of these commissions had subpoena power to summon witnesses or get evidence.
They relied on voluntary participation from victims, civil society, guerilla groups, government,
and the military. These cases were characterized by proactive programs of interviewing victims,
partnerships with civil society and religious groups, and some compliance from governments that
had initiated the truth commissions. General patterns of noncompliance from the military in all
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four countries was expected – in Argentina and Chile, which emerged from military
dictatorships, the military had a vested interest in keeping its crimes secret in order to continue
staying in power, while in Guatemala and Peru, the militaries that had committed abuses did not
experience any type of transition or democratic accountability. While none of the commissions
studied were able to name individual perpetrators, often to appease perpetrators still in power
and maintain stability, this feature is tempered by the fact that the commissions were not judicial
bodies that could charge individuals with crimes. However, commissions did build lists of
individual perpetrators that were forwarded to the government or the judicial system for
prosecutions, and in the case of Chile, the list of individuals was published in a newspaper,
probably through a leak by someone in the commission. This pattern demonstrates that even
strictly prohibiting naming individual perpetrators publicly does not necessarily prevent public
disclosure. Truth commissions may identify individual perpetrators and pass this information on
privately, but members of the commission may make a political decision to leak the names of
individual perpetrators to influence public opinion.
The final report of each case demonstrates the political constraints that the commissions
felt they were operating under and the political choices each truth commission made in writing
its narrative of conflict. In Argentina and Chile, though the overwhelming majority of abuses
were committed by the state, the commissions identified the origins of violence as stemming
from conflict on both sides while carefully blaming the right-wing military juntas, knowing the
possibility of future violence. These political choices to avoid unequivocally and
overwhelmingly allocating blame on right-wing regimes give weight to critiques that truth
commissions can be exploited to keep the same elites in power and not address the economic and
political disparities between different groups in the country. In Guatemala and Peru, the
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commissions identified the urgent need to address the historical economic and political
oppression of indigenous people, who had been disproportionately harmed during the conflicts.
These two commissions made more direct statements about the perpetrators and the victims of
conflict.

Material Reparations Programs in Comparison
This paper looks specifically at material reparations programs that pay victims and their
families reparations through monetary payments, which constitute only one part of the broader
concept of reparations outlined in Section II of the paper. In all four cases, monetary reparations
programs were combined with other reparations programs, including symbolic reparations,
health and education services, collective community grants, and new legal classifications.
Therefore, comparing the monetary payments of reparations programs in the case studies cannot
provide a full picture of the efficacy of reparations, but can show how countries prioritized
monetary reparations by the percent of GDP that the reparations would consume and what
percent of the population would be impacted.
Table 3 below calculates two percentage figures as points of comparison between the
monetary reparations programs in each of the four countries. These figures are useful in
comparing the countries with each other but are not as helpful in gauging the realistic annual
economic impact from each program. Because each country’s reparations program took different
forms, including lump-sum payments or pensions to victims, and payments to families that were
split or given in fixed amounts, it is difficult to compare the absolute payments given to various
groups in each country. Rather, the “% of Reparations Payment to Country GDP Year of First
Reparations Program” column calculates the impact that the total reparations spending of a
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country had on its GDP the year that the first reparations payment was paid. Governments could
forecast the costs of the reparations program, so looking at the percent of annual GDP that the
total program would cost gives a rough idea of how much economic commitment each
government was willing to give. The “% Total Number of Reparations Beneficiaries to 2019
Population” column shows how much of the 2019 population of each country was impacted
through reparations payments, either through payments to victims or their families.

TABLE 3: Reparations Analysis, GDP, and Population
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Country

Total
Amount of
Material
Reparations
Paid (from
inception to
present)

Year of
First
Reparations
Program
Payment

Argentina

$3.066 billion

1991

Chile I

$460 million

1992

Chile II

$720 million

2004

Guatemala

$50-$100
million

2005

Peru

$88 million

2006

Total
% of Total
% Total
Country GDP Reparations
Number of
First
Payment to
Reparations
Reparations Country GDP Beneficiaries
Program
Year of First
to 2019
Payment298
Reparations Population299
Program
$189.72
billion
$45.964
billion

1.62%

.036%

1.0%

0.13% from
first and
second
Chilean truth
commissions

$122.965
billion
$27.211
billion

0.59%

see above

0.18% - .37%

0.20 %

1.0%

0.26%

$88.643
billion

2019 GDP values taken from the World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GT-PE-AR-CL
299
2019 population figures taken from the World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=GT-PE-AR-CL
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While Argentina paid out the most monetary reparations in terms of its GDP, the
monetary reparations benefitted a much smaller percentage of the population than in other
countries. The two Chilean commissions and their reparations programs together paid the next
most in monetary reparations, but the two programs again benefitted a smaller percent of the
population than in Guatemala or Peru. The Guatemalan and Peruvian reparations programs
impacted more than six to seven times the percentage of their populations than the Argentine
program, and around twice the percentage of their populations as the Chilean program, though
the total impact on GDP was less than in Argentina or Chile.
Argentina and Chile were and still are the wealthier two countries of the group, with
GDPs per capita of about $9,900 and $15,000, respectively.300 From 1989 to 2001, Argentina
had a higher GDP per capita than Chile, and Chile overtook Argentina from 2002 and onwards.
From the 1990s and on, Peru has been poorer than Argentina and Chile, and Guatemala has been
the poorest of the four countries. Peru has a GDP per capita of about $6900 while Guatemala has
a GDP per capita of about $4600.301 These trends in GDP and reparations payments may suggest
that in poorer countries, the percent of GDP that monetary reparations take may be hindered due
to the lack of total funds available or because priorities are different. In Guatemala and Peru,
material reparations payments perhaps did not have as much impact on the material factors of
victims’ lives, but the broader reach may signal the government acknowledging to indigenous
people the historical harms that it had caused them, creating an opportunity for these groups to
take more power in politics.
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SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS
Ethnic and Class Conflict
The instances of class and ethnic conflict discussed by the case studies demonstrate how
truth commissions can be particularly helpful in achieving justice in cases with a dimension of
ethnic conflict. In Guatemala and Peru, the conflict and its victims demonstrate that ethnic
conflict is the defining feature, not class. Though ethnicity and class were closely linked, as is
common in many societies, the lens of ethnicity fully captures the fact that abuses were
disproportionately committed against specific ethnic groups.
Truth commissions can more easily remedy the class-based characteristics of conflict
through general economic policies or laws, as is common in most commission recommendations.
The impact of ethnic conflict is much harder to remedy. In Guatemala and Peru, the historical
ethnic and economic discrimination against indigenous people was only intensified by the
conflict – with genocide against the Maya in Guatemala and the disproportionate murder of
indigenous people in Peru.
Truth commissions are particularly helpful in identifying the systemic forms of societal
and governmental racism and discrimination. They are uniquely positioned to give a mouthpiece
to historically oppressed groups and influence public opinion about these forms of historical
systemic discrimination and racism. With this basis of knowledge and narrative of the past,
countries are more likely to address the root causes of conflict and create conditions for the
amelioration of the marginalization of specific ethnic groups.
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Effectiveness of Truth Commissions
The case studies have demonstrated that truth commissions are an effective means of
achieving justice after mass or systemic abuses. This is not to say that truth commissions are
perfect tools or that they should be used in all contexts. One must examine mechanisms of
transitional justice by their abilities to deliver justice to victims and society, address the systemic
foundations of conflict, and build a more just future. No single mechanism can effectively
achieve closure of conflict, but individual transitional justice mechanisms each contribute to this
goal.
In most cases of conflict, new regimes, victims of abuses, and legal thinkers agree on the
necessity of prosecuting perpetrators — but prosecutions cannot often deliver comprehensive
justice in conflicts marked by systemic abuses. This is because prosecutions can be constrained
in multiple ways. If legitimate information about abuses does not exist, prosecutions cannot
proceed. In other cases, prosecutions cannot feasibly be the first approach if abusers still retain
the power to reignite conflict and abuses. If prosecutions do proceed, they may be extremely
long, which can leave victims and the public feeling unfulfilled by mechanisms of justice years
after a conflict ends.
Truth commissions emerge as a powerful tool to address these barriers to prosecution
and the comprehensive structures of conflict due to the flexibility in their designs, allowing them
to adapt to the political circumstances they exist in. Truth commissions can position themselves
in unstable transitions or peace agreements to mediate between different sides and begin the
process of studying and documenting the abuses that took place. Their findings can be the
foundation for justice through other mechanisms, including prosecutions and symbolic and
material reparations programs. Choices in truth commission design through initial mandates
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about the scope and role of reparations and recommendations in the final report, the
demographics of commissioners appointed, subpoena power, private versus public interviews,
juridical or social science frameworks, and other mechanisms of design can be adapted to fit best
into the conflict and context of each country. This choice in design, not held back by strict
juridical standards and procedures, not only allows truth commissions to identify cases of abuses
for future prosecutions and reparations programs, but also highlight the systematic forms of
abuses. A truth commission’s final report can give the government legitimacy in pursuing reform
and prosecution based on the findings and recommendations of the report and gives victim
groups, civil society, and international organizations a basis from which to push for more
comprehensive reform and legislation.
It is impossible to know the counterfactual of using or not using a truth commission after
conflict. However, the case studies of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru have shown that
their work has left the countries they operated in more peaceful and closer to achieving
comprehensive justice for victims and society, which is better than inaction. If commissions had
not been created in these countries, a legitimate source identifying the systemic nature of abuses
and conflict would not have existed, and the various political and legal reforms, reparations
programs, and successful prosecutions that came from commission recommendations may not
have been possible.
Referring to the conceptual foundations of truth commissions discussed in Section I after
analyzing the case studies better informs these foundations. Under Elster’s institutional forms of
transitional justice – administrative, political, and legal justice, the cases have shown that truth
commissions are a useful tool that can enable the effective use of other political, legal, and
administrative transitional justice mechanisms. The findings of truth commissions give
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recommendations and legitimacy to the political and administrative reforms that a government
wishes to undertake. The documentation of individual cases of abuse and the identification of
systemic abuses provides the basis for legal justice through both domestic and international
courts. Under Teitel’s genealogy of transitional justice, future truth commissions will fall into
Phase III, where transitional justice mechanisms and international collaboration become the
standard approach to achieving justice after conflict. The cases have shown that involvement
from the United Nations can build the legitimacy and impact of truth commissions by creating
commissions and appointing commissioners as neutral investigators. International courts,
international human rights groups, and other international institutions can work with victims and
activists domestically to pressure the implementation of the recommendations of truth
commissions. While there is a risk of international involvement being labeled as an intrusion into
domestic affairs, previous cases have shown how these bodies are becoming important partners
in individual countries.

Limitations
This support for truth commissions must not be made idealistically, and the enthusiasm of
those advocating for and designing truth commissions must be tempered by a realistic
understanding of the constraints of their work and impact. A truth commission’s strength lies in
its ability to adapt to a political context, but it is also constrained by this same political context.
As demonstrated in the case studies, high degrees of political support from the executive,
legislative, or the public can lead to truth commissions that are effective in delivering more
concrete reform or reparations programs. Weak political support, either during a commission’s
inception or after the release of its report means that even if a commission’s work and report are
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extremely comprehensive and significant, there is nothing compelling a government to follow
through with the findings or recommendations. In these cases, however, victim groups, civil
society, and international organizations have shown their power in using a truth commission’s
work and report as a basis to pressure governments to implement its recommendations.
Truth commissions must be careful in placing blame in their findings. Because they
often serve as mediating tools between multiple sides, their reports also try to mediate placing
blame on different sides. Commissioners, aware of these political dynamics, often are careful to
not fully and directly acknowledge the crimes and abuses of those who are still in power, but this
tendency can be detrimental for victims and society. Even when conflicts are overwhelmingly
committed by one side, often the state, the narrative of placing blame on both sides can reinforce
injustices suffered by victims and hinder the creation of more comprehensive reforms necessary
to ameliorate the very systemic injustices that led to the pattern of abuse committed against poor
and marginalized ethnic groups.
Truth commissions usually cannot document every single victim, abuse, and perpetrator,
and their tendency to not be given the power to subpoena means that they cannot paint an allencompassing picture of what happened, often only collaborating with those willing to
cooperate. This is an important feature that can often limit the details of a commission’s findings.
However, other mechanisms such as prosecutions may be able to identify individual details of
cases but are limited by their ability to identify and address the systemic nature of abuses.
Establishing a truth commission is also not a zero-sum decision – they can be and have been
combined with other transitional justice mechanisms to create more effective means of achieving
justice.
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Truth Commissions and Reparations
The case studies have demonstrated that truth commissions do provide a basis for
practical material reparations programs. In each of these cases, if a truth commission and its final
report had not been published, material reparations programs as comprehensive as the ones
implemented in each country may not have been possible. These commissions identified victims
and the abuses committed against them, put this information into a database, and proposed
reparations and other recommendations that often became the framework for reparations laws.
Without the findings of a truth commission, supporters of reparations programs would not have a
starting point of information.
In situations of a lack of political will after a truth commission finishes its work, as
described above, reparations programs can lose priority with governments. This does not mean
that truth commissions play any role in directly preventing the implementation of a reparations
program. A commission’s findings can become the cultural, political, and legal tools that victim
groups and civil society use to pressure the government to create a reparations program.
Truth commissions and reparations programs can provide more comprehensive justice
together than if each mechanism was used individually. This is because truth commissions and
reparations programs reinforce the effectiveness and legitimacy of one another. A truth
commission provides the informational basis to launch a reparations program with lists of
victims and abuses and estimates of the scale of abuses. A reparations program legitimizes itself
by using the findings of the truth commissions. As the reparations program registers new cases of
victims not documented by the commission and begins paying reparations to signal the wrong of
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abuses carried out against victims, it continues to legitimize the recommendations of the truth
commission and adds further dimensions to its findings.
Together, truth commissions and reparations programs achieve unique types of justice for
victims and society. These two mechanisms deliver victim-centered justice by establishing the
truth, telling victims’ stories, providing reparations as one type of acknowledgment of abuse
from the state, and facilitating prosecutions. For a society, the identification of systemic abuses
and perpetrators of violence helps it understand its history to build a more just future. Though the
expectations of these two mechanisms must be tempered by reality, one can justifiably be
optimistic about their ability to bring a society closer to achieving comprehensive justice.
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